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INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS
In 1977 we published an article in this Review that dis-
cussed the legal aspects of the installment land contract.1 The
installment contract was then, and continues to be, widely used
as a device for seller financing of real estate. In our judgment,
and increasingly in the judgment of the courts, that is a mistake.
Few situations, if any, would lead an informed lawyer to advise
his client to use an installment contract rather than its financing
cousin, the note secured by a mortgage or deed of trust.
Since the prior article was published, the courts have con-
tinued to place impediments in the path of the vendor who must
realize on the security of the contract. The law has grown in-
creasingly complex and disadvantageous to vendors. The install-
ment contract device persists only because of a lack of under-
standing by buyers, sellers, and brokers, and because most such
transactions occur without a lawyer's involvement. Unfortu-
nately, the role of counsel is typically to "pick up the pieces"
after the contract has been executed and default has occurred.
In the present article we give renewed attention to the fa-
miliar problems covered in our prior work and focus on several
new issues. In particular, we focus on issues relating to the par-
ties' use of their contract rights as security for further financing,
the rights of creditors of the parties, and recent developments in
bankruptcy and federal income tax law. More than half of the
material is new, but readers acquainted with the previous article
will find that much of its structure and analysis survives.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
The installment land contract is the most common substi-
tute for the mortgage or deed of trust. It is also sometimes re-
ferred to as a "contract for deed," a "long-term land contract,"
or a "land sale contract." The installment land contract and the
purchase money mortgage fulfill the identical economic function:
permitting the seller to finance the unpaid portion of the real
estate purchase price. Under the installment land contract, the
vendee normally takes possession and makes monthly install-
ment payments of principal and interest until the principal is
paid off. The vendor retains legal title until the final payment is
made, at which time full title is conveyed to the vendee. Such
contracts may be amortized over time periods as short as a year
1. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint,
1977 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 541.
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or as long as more than twenty years. During the contract pe-
riod, the vendee normally will be required to pay taxes, maintain
casualty insurance, and keep the premises in good repair.
The installment land contract must be distinguished from
the ordinary executory contract for the sale of land, variously
known as an "earnest money contract," a "binder," or a "mar-
keting contract." The earnest money contract is used primarily
to establish the parties' rights and liabilities during the period
between the date of the bargain and the date of closing. This
period is usually only a month or two. At the end of the period
title passes to the purchaser and security agreements, if any, are
consummated. While the earnest money contract is completed at
closing when the purchaser either tenders the full purchase price
of the land or enters into a separate security agreement, the in-
stallment land contract governs the parties throughout the life
of the debt. Indeed, it is not uncommon for parties to agree to
enter into an installment land contract at the closing date of the
earnest money contract.
Traditionally the vendor in an installment land contract has
relied primarily on a forfeiture clause. The forfeiture clause,
found in virtually every installment contract, typically provides
that "time is of the essence" and that when a vendee fails to
comply with the contract, including the obligation to pay
promptly, the vendor has the option to declare the contract ter-
minated. The vendor can then take possession of the premises
without legal process and can retain all prior payments as liqui-
dated damages. Generally, the clause also relieves the vendor
from all further obligations under the contract.
As one commentator has aptly pointed out, "If the contract
is enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded, [the
installment land] contract gives the vendor a very favorable
remedy, much more advantageous than would be available under
a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust."' 2 Indeed, under a
mortgage or deed of trust, the defaulting mortgagor has a right
to redeem (the equity of redemption) which the mortgagee can
eliminate only by a foreclosure proceeding should the mortgagor
prove to be uncooperative.3 Furthermore, in many states the
2. Comment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L.
REv. 240, 244 (1959); see also Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale
Contract, 41 ALB. L. REV. 71, 73-74 (1977).
3. See G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.1-7.5 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter cited as NELSON & WHITMAN].
[1985
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mortgagor has postsale statutory redemption rights even after a
foreclosure sale.' Conversely, the forfeiture clause in an install-
ment land contract appears to give the vendor an efficient rem-
edy unfettered by such equitable and statutory mortgagor pro-
tections. However, it is important to emphasize that if the
vendee resists forfeiture, the installment land contract is advan-
tageous only if it is enforceable as written and if title will not be
clouded.
Installment land contracts have traditionally been used as
mortgage substitutes in those states where the substantive law
of mortgages and the procedural aspects of foreclosure are con-
sidered promortgagor. For example, in many states, judicial fore-
closure is the only method of foreclosing a mortgage." Judicial
foreclosure, often a time-consuming and costly procedure, re-
quires a full court proceeding in which all interested persons
must be made parties. Against a mortgagor who contests the
mortgagee's claims, it may take several years to conclude such
an action. Thus, utilization of the installment land contract in
such states, whatever its risks, is perhaps understandable. But
the risks are high, as we will show below.
II. THE FORFEITURE REMEDY-SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Traditionally installment land contract forfeiture provisions
were routinely enforced in favor of the vendor.6 The courts pre-
sumably based enforcement of such provisions on a desire to
carry out the intent of the parties, even though forfeiture often
resulted in a substantial loss to the vendee and a windfall gain
to the vendor.7 Enforcement became especially burdensome on
the vendee as the contract neared completion and the vendee's
cash investment increased. Courts tended to ignore the mortgage
substitute aspect of the installment land contract and to treat it
instead as an executory contract for the sale of land.
However, during the past several decades, an increasing
number of courts and legislatures have focused on the install-
ment land contract and its forfeiture clause with a mortgage law
analogy in mind. One court recently asked, "If [the absolute
4. See id. §§ 8.4-8.7.
5. See id. § 7.11.
6. See Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IowA L. REv.
786, 788 (1961); Comment, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28
U. FLA. L. REv. 156, 159 (1975).
7. Note, supra note 6, at 788.
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deed] kind of forfeiture may not be enforced by the secured
party according to the express terms of the agreement, why,
then, should a forfeiture under a land sale contract be so en-
forced?"" The foregoing process, however, has not produced ei-
ther an analytical or practical consensus. Consequently, the law
in this area is not susceptible to orderly analysis. "Not only does
the law vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but within any one
state results may vary depending upon the type of action
brought, the exact terms of the land contract, and the facts of
the particular case." 9 The interplay of these factors makes pre-
dicting whether the vendee's interest will be forfeited extremely
difficult. While forfeitures are still occasionally judicially en-
forced,'0 no jurisdiction will automatically enforce a forfeiture
provision as it is written."' This change is the result of legislative
and judicial intervention to ameliorate the harsh impact of auto-
matic forfeiture.
III. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON FORFEITURE
Several states have attempted to alleviate some of the
harshness in forfeiture clauses by enacting legislation regulating
the circumstances under which forfeiture will be permitted.
These statutes often incorporate a "grace period" within which
late payments must be accepted. Perhaps the best example of
this type of legislation is the Iowa statute."
The Iowa statute provides that installment land contracts
may be canceled only by a specified procedure. The vendor must
provide written notice to the defaulting vendee and to the per-
8. Braunstein v. Trottier, 54 Or. App. 687, 692, 635 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1981).
9. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 391, 416 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
10. See Hamner v. Rock Mountain Lake, Inc., 451 So. 2d 249 (Ala. 1984); Bell v.
Coots, 451 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1984); Curry v. Tucker, 616 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1980); Ellis v.
Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977); McEnroe v. Morgan, 678 P.2d 595
(Idaho App. 1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Cape, 100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983); Jacobs
v. Phillippi, 697 P.2d 128 (N.M. 1985); Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch
Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982); Braunstein v. Trottier, 54 Or. App. 687,
635 P.2d 1379 (1981); Stonebraker v. Zinn, 286 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1982). Cf. United
States v. Winterburn, 749 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1984).
11. Even in states that otherwise enforce forfeitures, courts will, for example, re-
quire the vendor to provide notice of intent to forfeit and a reasonable period of time "to
cure the default," even though such actions are not required by the contract. See, e.g.,
Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 678 P.2d 1163 (1984); Brummett v. Sando, 2 Wash.
App. 33, 466 P.2d 187 (1970).
12. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-656.6 (West 1950).
[1985
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son in possession of the real estate. The notice must identify the
real estate, specify the terms of the contract that have been vio-
lated, and inform the vendee that he has thirty days in which to
correct his default. If the vendee performs within this time pe-
riod, the forfeiture is avoided. If he does not, the notice of forfei-
ture, together with proof of service, may be recorded to consti-
tute constructive notice of the completed forfeiture. Several
other states have statutes similar to those of Iowa;13 the grace
period varies from thirty days in Iowa to as long as one year in
North Dakota. In Minnesota and Arizona the grace period de-
pends on the percentage of the contract price the vendee hd§
paid.14 Some statutes permit nonjudicial forfeiture, while others
allow foreclosure only by judicial action. The purpose of these
statutes, however, is to alleviate the harshness of forfeitures, not
to prevent them.15
Several observations should be made about the statutory
regulations. First, as a practical matter, the statutory grace pe-
riod approach is analogous to the mortgage law concept of strict
foreclosure. This mortgage foreclosure method, rarely used in
the United States, allows a judicial grace period during which
the mortgagor either pays the mortgage debt or forfeits the land
to the mortgagee. 6 Similarly, if a vendee under an installment
contract fails to correct a default within the statutory grace pe-
riod, he loses the land. It is perhaps ironic that in some respects
the statutory contract forfeiture procedures are more "pro-
vendee" than the strict foreclosure concept is "pro-mortgagor."
Under strict foreclosure, the mortgagor must pay the accelerated
debt or lose the land. On the other hand, in states such as Iowa
and Minnesota, the defaulting vendee, rather than pay the accel-
erated debt, need only pay the arrearages within the grace pe-
riod in order to reinstate the contract.17
13. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West Supp. 1977); ND. CENT. CODE §§ 32-
18-01 to -06 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-50-01 to -07 (1979).
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West Supp. 1984) (90 days maximum); Amz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-741-742 (1956) (9 months maximum).
15. See Note, supra note 6, at 797; NELSON & WmTMAN, supra note 3, §§ 7.9-7.10.
16. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 481-482 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as NELSON].
17. See Hampton Farmers Coop. Co. v. Fehd, 257 Iowa 555, 559, 133 N.W.2d 872,
874 (1965); Needles v. Keys, 149 Minn. 477, 480, 184 N.W. 33, 34 (1921); Comment,
Installment Land Contracts-Vendors' Remedies-Combining Acceleration and Forfei-
ture, 51 IowA L. REV. 488 (1966).
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Second, to some degree these statutes have institutionalized
or formalized the forfeiture concept and, in so doing, may have
discouraged judicial interference in those situations where the
vendor complies with the statutory forfeiture method.'8 Courts
in states having such statutes have suggested that relief from an
"unconscionable forfeiture" may be available.l9 For example, the
Iowa Supreme Court has held that, notwithstanding vendee de-
fault and vendor compliance with statutory termination require-
ments, if the vendor himself was in default "equity dictates a
cancellation of the forfeiture. ' 20 Also, statutory forfeiture may
be inappropriate for certain minor, nonmonetary defaults.21
However, judicial intervention in statutory termination settings
tends to focus more on technical statutory compliance and inter-
pretation than on independent analysis of the fairness of
forfeiture.22
Finally, one practical advantage of statutory regulation is
that it encourages the stability of land titles. Whatever the de-
fects of statutory regulation, title examiners in many states rou-
tinely approve of the titles derived through statutory proceed-
ings. 23 Title examiners give approval for at least two reasons.
First, the courts' tendency to reject nonstatutory attacks on for-
feitures encourages reliance on forfeiture proceedings that com-
ply with the applicable statute. Second, many of these statutes
provide for the recording of a written and formalized memorial
of compliance with the statute.24 As a result, the title examiner
18. Note, supra note 6, at 797; Comment, Remedying Inequities of Forfeiture in
Land Installment Contracts, 64 IowA L. Rav. 158 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Jensen v. Schreck, 275 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1979) (court suggests that
while relief from forfeiture may be appropriate in certain situations, forfeiture was not
unreasonable where vendee's contract payments and other investment in the real estate
was less than five percent of the contract price).
20. Keokuk State Bank v. Eckley, 354 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Skubal v.
Meeker, 279 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1979); see also Warren v. Yocum, 223 N.W.2d 258
(Iowa 1974).
21. See Lett v. Grummer, 300 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1981) (statutory forfeiture refused
where failure to make minor repairs did not threaten security).
22. See Miller v. American Wonderlands, Inc., 275 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 1979) (upholds
statutory forfeiture based on a $10.48 default on a $30,000 contract and vendee's al-
lowing liens to be filed on the premises); Conley v. Downing, 321 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1982)
(statutory termination valid notwithstanding misstatement of attorney's fees in notice of
cancellation); Dale v. Pushor, 246 Minn. 254, 75 N.W.2d 595 (1956); Note, supra note 6,
at 792. Cf. Keokuk State Bank v. Eckley, 354 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (waiver
defeats forfeiture).
23. Nelson, The Use of Installment Land Contracts in Missouri: Courting Clouds
on Titles, 33 J. Mo. B. 161, 164 (1977).
24. The Iowa statute exemplifies such a provision:
[1985
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is able to rely on the record for evidence of a permissible forfei-
ture. This is true even when the original contract is recorded. On
the other hand, in states that lack statutory control of the forfei-
ture process, the recording of a statement that forfeiture has oc-
curred may be regarded by a subsequent title examiner as a self-
serving assertion that may constitute a cloud on title.
The Maryland statute takes a substantially different ap-
proach from those described above.25 Forfeiture is prohibited
when an installment land contract is for the sale of residential
property to a noncorporate vendee. The vendor can utilize the
land to satisfy the vendee's debt only through a foreclosure sale
identical to that used for a mortgage.2 6 The vendee is entitled to
receive as surplus from the sale the amount by which the sale
price exceeds the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Since
installment land contracts in residential transactions are treated
like mortgages, there is apparently no incentive to continue their
use in the residential setting. On the other hand, common law
forfeiture rules presumably still apply to nonresidential install-
ment land contracts.
The Ohio legislation governing installment land contracts is
also somewhat unique. While it incorporates a grace period con-
cept, it focuses on how long and how much the vendee has paid
under the contract. The statute categorizes contracts on "prop-
erty improved by a dwelling" in two ways: (1) those which have
been in effect less than five years and on which less than twenty
percent of the principal amount has been paid, and (2) those
which have been in effect five years or more or on which twenty
percent or more has been paid. In the former setting, forfeiture,
If the terms and conditions as to which there is default are not performed
within said thirty days, the party serving said notice or causing the same to be
served, may file for record in the office of the county recorder a copy of the
notice aforesaid with proofs of service attached or indorsed thereon (and, in
case of service by publication, his personal affidavit that personal service could
not be made within this state) and when so fied and recorded, the said record
shall be constructive notice to all parties of the due forfeiture and cancellation
of said contract.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 656.5 (West 1950).
25. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -108 (1974); MD. RULES W79.
26. MD. RULES W70-W72, W77.
27. See also MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 52-401 to -417 (Supp. 1975), in which the
Montana Small Tract Financing Act of 1963 made possible an optional power of sale
deed of trust mechanism for tracts of 15 acres or less. One commentator has suggested
that this legislation makes the installment land contract in Montana unnecessary. See
Lohn, Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 MONT. L. REV. 110
(1975).
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while subject to a thirty-day grace period, is specifically author-
ized.2 s In the latter situation, the contract must be foreclosed
judicially.29 Installment land contracts that fall into neither of
the above categories are governed solely by case law. Interest-
ingly, those Ohio contracts on which forfeiture is statutorily au-
thorized may be falling prey to the institutionalization process
described earlier. According to one commentator, it is likely in
such cases
that a court will grant forfeiture as a matter of law rather than
exercise its equitable jurisdiction and consider factors normally
used ... in non-statutory forfeiture cases .... [T]he vendee
subject to statutory forfeiture may find himself faced with a
judge who either feels constrained by the statute from granting
equitable relief or takes comfort in the simplicity of the statute
and ignores the possibility of equitable action.30
Oklahoma legislation is perhaps the most sweeping and de-
cisive statutory regulation of installment land contracts. In one
relatively short paragraph, an Oklahoma statute states that in-
stallment land contracts
for purchase and sale of real property made for the purpose or
with the intention of receiving the payment of money and
made for thepurpose of establishing an immediate and contin-
uing right of possession of the described real property, whether
such instruments be from the debtor to the creditor, or from
the debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor, shall
to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be
subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regula-
tions, restraints and forms as are prescribed in relation to
mortgages. 1
The effect of this statutory provision is to treat all installment
land contracts entailing a transfer of possession to the vendee as
mortgages and thus make the forfeiture remedy unavailable to a
vendor. Thus, installment land contracts presumably have been
rendered obsolete in Oklahoma. This legislation is especially sig-
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05, 5313.06, 5313.08 (Page 1981).
29. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07 (Page 1981).
30. Durham, Forfeiture of Residential Land Contracts in Ohio: The Need for Fur-
ther Reform of a Reform Statute, 16 AKRON L. REv. 397, 430 (1983).
31. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 11A (West Supp. 1984). See Panama Timber Co., Inc.
v. Barsanti, 633 P.2d 1258 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (installment land contract deemed con-
structive mortgage).
[1985
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nificant since Oklahoma permits only judicial, and not power of
sale, foreclosure of mortgages.2
IV. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON FORFEITURE
Absent statutory regulation, numerous state courts have re-
fused to enforce forfeiture clauses deemed unreasonable or ineq-
uitable. These courts have employed several approaches to save
the vendee from forfeiture. Some courts, for example, have per-
mitted the vendee to tender the remainder of the purchase price,
or even his arrearages, in a suit or counterclaim for specific per-
formance of the contract. When the vendee is unable or unwill-
ing to redeem, courts have occasionally ordered the judicial fore-
closure of the land contract. Some courts, after determining that
a particular forfeiture clause is unfair, have extended to the de-
faulting vendee the right to restitution-the right to recoup his
payments to the extent that they exceed the vendor's damages
caused by the vendee's default.
Of course, many state courts have not considered the forfei-
ture clause in all of the remedial contexts described above, nor
have they always been theoretically precise. Some courts have
utilized contract principles to protect the defaulting vendee
from an inequitable forfeiture provision and other courts have
gone a long way toward simply treating the installment land
contract as a mortgage-in a manner similar to the Oklahoma
statute. Still others have employed a confusing amalgam of
mortgage and contract law. This section examines various ap-
proaches employed by state courts to mitigate the harshness of
forfeiture.
A. Waiver by the Vendor as an Excuse for Delinquency
Frequently a vendor will accept one or several late pay-
ments from the vendee without taking action to declare a forfei-
ture. When the vendor finally runs out of patience and informs
the vendee that forfeiture has occurred, the vendee may argue
that the vendor's prior behavior constitutes a waiver of the time
provisions of the contract and that the vendor is legally bound
to accept the late payments. This dispute often surfaces in a
vendee's suit or counterclaim for specific performance of the
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 686 (West 1960). For an analysis of the statute, see
Comment, The Decline of the Contract for Deed in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 557 (1979).
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contract. The vendee may be willing to tender the entire
purchase price, or he may insist upon an opportunity to make
up his arrearages and resume the original payment schedule.
Many courts have adopted the vendee's position in this situ-
ation.3 In effect, these courts hold that the vendor's waiver
avoids the effect of the forfeiture clause and creates in the ven-
dee a right analogous to an equity of redemption. According to
this view, if the vendor had given the vendee clear notice that no
further delinquencies would be tolerated, and if this notice had
been given in adequate time to allow the vendee to get back on
schedule, the vendor might thereby have preserved his right of
forfeiture as to future installments. Since the vendor did not do
so, the court itself will generally fix a reasonable time within
which the vendee must cure the delinquencies.
The courts of Missouri and Utah have been particularly in-
clined to employ this technique. One commentator aptly de-
scribed the Missouri situation:
Thus, Missouri courts today seem hesitant to give full ef-
fect to forfeiture provisions as measures of liquidated damages
in installment land contracts. They are likely to find that such
provisions have been waived by the vendor due to such acts as
his acceptance of late payments of principal or of interest on
late payments after the delinquency of those payments. Fur-
thermore, waiver of forfeiture provisions is equally likely to be
found in any of the following in which a land installment con-
tract is involved: viz., an action for ejectment by a vendor, an
action for specific performance by a defaulting vendee, a coun-
terclaim for specific performance by a defaulting vendee who is
defendant to an action for ejectment, or even a trespass action
by a defaulting vendee against his vendor concerning the land
that is the subject of the contract. The finding that such a for-
33. See In re Northern Ill. Dev. Corp., 309 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 965 (1963); Jahnke v. Palomar Fin. Corp., 22 Ariz. App. 369, 527 P.2d 771
(1974); Triplett v. Davis, 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964); Welch v. Cooper, 670
S.W.2d 454 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Peterson v. Ridenour, 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d
848 (1955); Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 656 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Krentz. v.
Johnson, 36 Ill. App. 3d 142, 343 N.E.2d 165 (1976); Miles Homes, Inc. v. Mintjal, 17 IMl.
App. 3d 642, 307 N.E.2d 724 (1974); Pierce v. Yochum, 330 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. App. 1975);
Keokuk State Bank v. Eckley, 354 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Bailey v. Lilly, 667
P.2d 933 (Mont. 1983); Shervold v. Schmidt, 359 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1984); Soltis v. Liles,
275 Or. 537, 551 P.2d 1297 (1976); Stinemeyer v. Wesco Farms, Inc., 260 Or. 109, 487
P.2d 65 (1971); Bradley v. Apel, 531 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Williamson v.
Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976); Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah 1975); Moeller v.
Good Hope Farms, 35 Wash. 2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950).
[1985
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feiture provision has been waived would be very likely if the
value of the land subject to the forfeiture provisions substan-
tially exceeded the amount still unpaid under the contract.34
The waiver cases vary and are difficult to reconcile. In some
cases rather innocuous forbearances by vendors have been trans-
lated into favorable holdings for vendees, 35 while in others quite
substantial leniency has been unavailing.36 In one Utah case,
for example, the vendees under an installment land contract for
the purchase of a house made sporadic late payments for the
first two years of the contract. Some monthly payments were
missed entirely. The vendor repeatedly demanded that the con-
tract be paid up to date, but from time to time the vendees were
assured that no forfeiture was contemplated "at that time." Fi-
nally, more than two years from the date of the contract, the
vendor declared a forfeiture and after unsuccessful negotiation
brought an unlawful detainer action to have the vendee ousted
and the contract forfeited. The trial court concluded that the
vendor had waived the strict performance of the contract. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the for-
feiture with the following language: "Under the circumstances of
this case, we believe that the buyers. . . were given a reasonable
length of time to clear themselves of default. . . .They had not
paid the equivalent of the rental value of the property for the
time they occupied it." 38
The quoted language is quite telling. Obviously, the amount
of the payments in relation to the rental value has nothing at all
to do with whether there was an effective waiver by the vendor.
It is difficult not to conclude that the court was manipulating
the waiver concept as a means of deciding whether, in terms of
fairness and economic equity, the vendee should have another
opportunity to make up his missed payments." Such decision
making may be salutary, but it should not be disguised.
34. Note, Property-Forfeiture Provisions in Missouri Installment Land Contracts,
29 Mo. L. REv. 222, 226 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Economy Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243, 152
N.E.2d 125 (1957); Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942).
37. Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 13 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).
38. Id. at 409, 195 P.2d at 751.
39. The court may have been confusing the waiver concept with the principle of
equitable relief from forfeiture. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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B. Recognition of an Equity of Redemption
A number of jurisdictions have taken the view that the ven-
dee, notwithstanding his default, should be granted a final op-
portunity to pay the balance owing on the contract or, in some
instances, the arrearages, before losing his land. Some courts
view this right, analogous to a mortgagor's equity of redemption,
as unconditional, while others are inclined to recognize it only if
the vendee's prior payments add up to a substantial investment
or "equity" in the property. Sometimes the existence of the right
turns on whether the vendee's payments significantly exceed the
property's rental value or some similar test. Moreover, some
cases require that the vendee not be guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith. The critical point is that, unlike the cases discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, these opinions do not rely upon a
prior waiver by the vendor.
A typical case is Nigh v. Hickman,40 decided by the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals. In Nigh a vendee, under an installment
land contract covering farmland, had paid almost thirty-five per-
cent of the total purchase price. The vendee then defaulted on
one payment by fifteen days, and the vendor refused to accept
the late payment. The vendee sued for specific performance and
tendered the balance owing on the contract. The appellate court
held that the trial court correctly granted specific performance
and that enforcing the forfeiture clause would have been inequi-
table. Although the contract contained no "time is of the es-
sence" clause, the court indicated that the result would not have
been different had such a clause been present.
A leading Hawaii Supreme Court decision, Jenkins v.
Wise 4 1 adopts the foregoing specific performance approach in
less ambivalent fashion. Prior to default, the vendees in Jenkins
had paid sixteen percent of the total purchase price of $100,000
under installment land contracts on two parcels of land. The
vendees defaulted on two semiannual $4,000 installment pay-
ments due in March and April, 1972. Pursuant to the contracts,
the vendors notified the vendees in September of the same year
that the contracts had been canceled. One month later, the
vendees contracted to sell the property to third parties for a
$51,000 profit, and, accordingly, promised the vendors that the
40. 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App. 1976); see also Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo.
App. 1977); Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wash. 2d 246, 173 P.2d 977 (1946).
41. 58 Hawaii 592, 574 P.2d 1337 (1978).
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original contracts soon would be paid in full. When payment was
not made by December, the vendors sought a judicial declara-
tion of cancellation of the contracts and the vendees counter-
claimed for specific performance. The Hawaii Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court order canceling the contracts and,
notwithstanding "time is of the essence" language contained
therein, held in favor of vendees' claim for specific performance.
According to the supreme court,
where the vendee's breach has not been due to gross negli-
gence, or to deliberate or bad-faith conduct on his part, and
the vendor can reasonably and adequately be compensated for
his injury, courts in equity will generally grant relief against
forfeiture and decree specific performance of the agree-
ment .... [A] key factor in [a trial court's] determination is
whether forfeiture would be harsh and unreasonable under the
circumstances.42
The court concluded that the vendees had acted in good faith
even though they had contracted to resell after being notified of
cancellation. Focusing on the fact that the vendees had incurred
architectural and building permit expenses, the court stated that
the vendees, "in good faith, were preparing to develop the prop-
erty themselves, but in the words of [one of the vendees], the
[contract to resell] was 'too good a deal.' 43
The relationship between granting specific performance to a
vendee and more traditional mortgage concepts is illustrated by
the Florida District Court of Appeals' opinion in H & L Land
Co. v. Warner." The vendee in Warner had made installment
payments for about five years, but during a four-year period of
nonpayment the vendor remained silent as to the vendee's de-
fault. The vendee ultimately sued for specific performance,
tendering the balance of the purchase price; the vendor counter-
42. Id. at 597, 574 P.2d at 1341.
43. Id. at 602, 574 P.2d at 1344. Jenkins was specifically reaffirmed by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Kaiman Realty, Inc. v. Carmichael, 65 Hawaii 637, 655 P.2d 872
(1982). In a supplemental opinion to Kaiman Realty, the Hawaii Supreme Court sug-
gested that Jenkins is applicable only to installment land contracts and not to Hawaii's
equivalent of earnest money contracts. See Kaiman Realty, Inc., v. Carmichael,
Hawaii -, 659 P.2d 63 (1983). See also K.M. Young Assoc., Inc. v. Cieslik, 675 P.2d
793 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983). For a clear-cut case of a denial of specific performance to a
grossly negligent vendee, see Curry v. Tucker, 616 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1980).
44. 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d
417 (Fla. 1963); Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1961).
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claimed for removal of the contract as a cloud on the vendor's
title. The court granted specific performance and stated:
[T]he vendor under a specifically .enforceable installment land
sale contract, who has received part of the purchase price and
has given the vendee possession of the land and the benefits
and burdens of ownership, is in essentially the same position as
a vendor who has conveyed the legal title and taken back a
"245purchase money mortgage ....
The court implicitly imposed at least three preconditions to spe-
cific performance: (1) the vendee must be in possession or have a
right to possession, (2) the contract must be specifically enforce-
able, and (3) the vendee must assert .and exercise his right of
redemption by tendering full payment.46
These conditions present problems, especially the last two.
Arguably, tying these two requirements together is an inconsis-
tent blending of contract and mortgage law. It is axiomatic that
a vendee in default does not have a right to specific performance
of a contract. Yet under mortgage law the right to redeem is not
exercised until there has been a default. In Warner the second
requirement was met because the court found that the vendor
had waived the vendee's default. However, as has been pointed
out,
By so holding, the court is going in circles. If one must tender
the unpaid balance as a condition precedent to the vesting of
the right of redemption, then one must exercise this right
before one is entitled to it-an anomaly, to be sure. Thus, the
rights of mortgagors will not be extended to purchasers in de-
fault who are either in straitened circumstances or unaware of
the right of redemption-the very individuals whom the mort-
gage statutes were designed to protect.47
Notwithstanding this apparent anomaly, more recent cases
reinforce the argument that, in general, Florida installment land
contracts will be treated as mortgages for redemption purposes.
In Hoffman v. Semet 48 a Florida District Court of Appeals held
that a vendee in default under an installment land contract had
an equity of redemption and that the vendee's successor was en-
titled to satisfy the total outstanding indebtedness due the ven-
45. 258 So. 2d at 295.
46. See Comment, supra note 6, at 168-70.
.47. Id. at 170.
48. 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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dor under the contract and to receive a conveyance of the real
estate. The court cited Warner for the proposition that an in-
stallment land contract "must be deemed and held to be a mort-
gage, subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same
regulations, restraints, and forms as are prescribed in relation to
mortgages. '49 Unlike the situation in Warner, however, there
had been no waiver of the default, and the contract was there-
fore not specifically enforceable within the implicit requirements
of Warner. The Semet court did not deal with this difficulty.
Instead, it simply repeated "equity of redemption" language in
referring to the vendee's interest. Moreover, later appellate deci-
sions,50 while not involving a tardy vendee seeking to redeem, so
pervasively assert that an installment land contract is a mort-
gage that it seems unlikely that a Florida vendee will be denied
mortgage redemption rights.
The Kansas case of Nelson v. Robinson5 illustrates how a
court can refuse to enforce a forfeiture provision and instead im-
pose a remedy that treats the installment land contract as an
equitable mortgage. The vendors in Nelson brought an action to
cancel an installment land contract for the sale of farmland. The
vendee was over $1,900 delinquent in back payments, but had
paid nearly one-third of the $48,000 purchase price and had
made valuable improvements to the land. The trial court refused
to permit forfeiture, but rather ordered strict foreclosure of the
contract. Under the terms of the decree, the vendee was given
six months in which to pay the entire amount remaining due on
the contract. Failure to pay within that period would result in
forfeiture of the land and back payments to the vendor. If the
vendee paid arrearages within ten days of the decree, however,
the redemption period would be extended to eighteen months.
Interestingly, the vendee, and not the vendor, appealed, and the
Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exercise of eq-
uitable discretion. It is noteworthy that the court here imposed
the relatively rare mortgage remedy of strict foreclosure which
49. Id. at 651 (quoting Midstate Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1961)).
50. See, e.g., Ricard v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 462 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Parise v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 438 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Ernest v. Carter, 368 So. 2d 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Cook v. Merrifield, 335 So. 2d
297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Torcise v. Perez, 319 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
51. 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959).
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was sought by neither party, but in which the vendor
acquiesced. 2
The Nelson decision clearly does not mean that all install-
ment land contracts in Kansas will be treated as mortgages. If,
for example, the vendee's stake in the property had been sub-
stantially less, immediate forfeiture might have been ordered.5 3
The case, however, illustrates that a Kansas vendor cannot rely
on automatic enforcement of the forfeiture clause. Thus, in Kan-
sas, courts may apply the law of mortgages to some installment
contracts and contract law to others.
In California the movement toward recognition of a right of
redemption for a defaulting vendee has received impetus from
general statutory provisions, although the application of the
statutes was uncertain until recently.5 4 In Barkis v. Scott5 5 the
California Supreme Court reevaluated a long line of earlier
precedents dealing with forfeiture. The court concluded that
when a forfeiture would otherwise result, the vendee can be re-
lieved therefrom under section 3275 of the Civil Code which pro-
vides that
Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto
incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by
reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be
relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the
other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or
fraudulent breach of duty."'
The vendor in Barkis sought to quiet title and enforce a forfei-
ture after the vendees inadvertently overdrew their bank ac-
count with their monthly house payment. The vendees' later ef-
forts to pay were refused by the vendor. The court held that
section 3275 should provide relief from forfeiture and that the
vendees had established the right to keep the contract in force.
Here the default was, at most, negligent and not "grossly negli-
gent, willful, or fraudulent."
52. This mortgage remedy is apparently the standard method in Wisconsin for ter-
minating a vendee interest. See Exchange Corp. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d
393 (1972).
53. For a discussion of the significance of the proportion paid, see Croft v. Jensen,
86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935).
54. See Comment, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment
Land Sale Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 191, 205 (1973).
55. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
56. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3275 (West 1970).
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In MacFadden v. Walker57 the California Supreme Court
dealt with the "willful, but repentant defaulting vendee." In
MacFadden an elderly vendee had been in willful default over
two years, but had paid over half of the purchase price. When
the vendor sought to quiet title to the property, the vendee
counterclaimed for specific performance, tendering the full
amount due and owing on the contract. The court held that the
policy against forfeitures required granting the right to specific
performance even when the default is willful. The court rea-
soned that, when taken together, the prohibition against puni-
tive damages contained in section 3294 of the Civil Code, the
strict limitations on the right to provide for liquidated damages
contained in sections 1670 and 1671, and the provision of section
3369 that "neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted
to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case," prevented a for-
feiture that had no reasonable relation to the damage caused by
the vendee's breach even when that breach is willful. The court
noted Professor Hetland's "persuasive arguments" that install-
ment land contracts should be treated like mortgages and deeds
of trust and that willfully defaulting debtors should therefore
have the right to redeem. However, it concluded that because
the vendee was entitled to specific performance "we need not
decide whether she might also be entitled to some other remedy
under the law governing security transactions."58
The ultimate conclusion that a tardy vendee should be
treated as a mortgagor for redemption purposes is still proving
illusive for California courts. In Kosloff v. Castle5" a vendor
under an installment land contract covering the sale of a house
for $15,000 declared a forfeiture after the vendee had been in
default on a final "balloon" payment of $11,400 for approxi-
mately a year and a half. A few months later, the vendor filed an
action in unlawful detainer and to quiet title. The trial court
refused to permit the vendee to tender the contract balance and
granted the vendor his requested relief. The District Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court determination. The court noted
that MacFadden allowed specific performance to be granted to
willfully defaulting vendees "in proper cases." The Kosloff court
57. 5 Cal. 3d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537, 488 P.2d 1353 (1971).
58. Id. at 816, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541, 488 P.2d at 1357; see also Williams Plumbing
Co. v. Sinsley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 126 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1975) (where breach was not
intentional).
59. 115 Cal. App. 3d 369, 171 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1981).
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emphasized that the vendee in MacFadden had paid over half of
the purchase price prior to her default, whereas the Kosloff ven-
dee had paid less than one-third of the price in the predefault
period. Moreover, the Kosloff vendee had not only been willful,
but also "grossly negligent," whereas the MacFadden default,
while willful, was based on the vendee's belief that withholding
payment was justified. Thus, the court found substantial evi-
dence to sustain the trial court's weighing of the equities.
The Kosloff court also refused to hold that an installment
land contract is a mortgage under Section 2924 of the Civil
Code, which states in part that "every transfer of an interest in
property, other than in trust, made only as a security for the
performance of another act, is to be deemed a mortgage." Had
the court so held, the vendee would have been afforded the re-
demption of a tardy mortgagor. Rather, the court stated, "any
reform in this area is more appropriately initiated by the Legis-
lature which is in a better position to effect and coordinate com-
prehensive answers to the many-faceted questions such a deter-
mination would evoke." 60
To vendors, the general trend toward recognizing an equity
of redemption is rather frightening. In the absence of a statute,
nothing but a court order can cut off an equity of redemption. In
effect, this means that the vendor will be forced to liti-
gate-precisely the thing he hoped to avoid by using the install-
ment contract. Even if the court follows the example of the Su-
preme Court of Kansas, granting forfeiture in the event the
purchaser is unable to redeem,61 the vendor's situation will be
far less advantageous than he expected when the contract was
signed.
C. Restitution
In a jurisdiction in which no equity of redemption is recog-
nized, or in a case in which the vendee cannot or will not re-
deem, traditional analysis would suggest that forfeiture should
follow. But in this area, too, the courts have been actively re-
forming the law. Increasingly, they are holding that forfeiture
may not be "free" and that the vendor must return the pay-
60. Id. at 377, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 312; see also Bartley v. Karas, 150 Cal. App. 3d 366,
197 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1983) (vendee not entitled to reinstatement by payment of arrear-
ages, but specific performance in vendee's favor appropriate where default not willful).
61. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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ments he has received insofar as they exceed his actual dam-
ages.6 2 Some courts, such as those of Utah, take this position
only in cases in which they conclude that an outright forfeiture
would be "unconscionable"6 3 but "unconscionable" may simply
mean that the vendee would suffer a substantial net loss if no
restitution were ordered. 4
The Utah cases usually measure the vendor's damages as
the fair rental value of the property during the period of the
vendee's occupancy, plus such incidental damages as repairs and
a sales commission upon resale. 5 In most situations presented,
the court has concluded that these items exceed the vendee's
payments and that he is not entitled to restitution.
For example, in Strand v. Mayne66 the vendees under an
installment land contract for the sale of a motel had made pay-
ments of principal and interest of over $19,000 on a $41,500
purchase price. They also had spent $9,500 on repairs on the
premises. Upon default, the vendors obtained possession by an
unlawful detainer action. The vendees subsequently brought an
action to recover the payments made under the contract on the
ground that retention by the vendor was unconscionable. The
Utah Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the ven-
dor, noting that the fair rental value of the motel up to the date
of forfeiture, when added to the down payment the vendees had
received on a resale of the property to a third party, exceeded
the total of their payments to the vendors. The court observed
that "[t]his clearly shows that the amount they have lost under
the forfeiture provision is not unconscionable."6
Similarly, in Weyher v. Peterson5 the Utah court affirmed a
judgment for a vendor under a forcible entry and detainer action
62. See, e.g., Moran v. Holman, 501 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1972); Jenkins v. Wise, 58
Hawaii 592, 574 P.2d 1337 (1978) (dictum); K.M. Young & Assoc. v. Cieslik, 675 P.2d 793
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d
103 (1959); Randall v. Riel, 123 N.H. 757, 465 A.2d 505 (1983); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d
681 (Utah 1981). Cf. Stevensen v. Owen, Mont. - , 687 P.2d 1010 (1984).
63. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).
64. The Utah Court has had difficulty in reaching a consensus as to what is "uncon-
scionable." See Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976). See also Erickson v. First Nat'l
Bank, - Mont. -, 697 P.2d 1332 (1985) (vendee had paid $154,751 while fair rental
value was 114,750; court concluded the amount forfeited was not so large as to be
unconscionable).
65. See, e.g., Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
66. 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963).
67. Id. at 357, 384 P.2d at 398.
68. 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
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based on a forfeiture clause. Finding that the rental value and
damages, totaling $10,505, exceeded the $9,387 the vendee had
paid on the contract, the court saw no inequity in refusing to
allow the vendee to recover some of his payments.
Utah vendees also encountered difficulties with the restitu-
tion theory when the court focused on the contract land's mar-
ket value rather than its rental value. In Park Valley Corp. v.
Bagley 9 the trial court determined that vendees who had paid
over $139,000 on a $1,080,000 installment land contract were en-
titled to almost half of that amount in restitution. After the
vendees' breach, vendors resold the land for $935,000, which was
$145,000 less than the contract price. In calculating the restitu-
tion amount, the trial court allowed the vendors only $15,000 of
the $145,000 as damages for their loss of bargain. It did so on
the theory that the contract price greatly exceeded the actual
value of the land. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision and stressed that it was not unconscionable to
hold vendees to an improvident bargain and that the vendors'
damages should be based on the $145,000 loss of bargain
amount. Accordingly, since this amount exceeded the vendees'
payments under the contract, the vendees were not entitled to
any restitution.
Although vendees generally have not fared well in Utah liti-
gation, 0 the reasoning of the above decisions indicates that com-
plete vendor reliance on the forfeiture clause is probably mis-
placed. In the above cases the court upheld forfeiture because it
believed the vendor's actual damages exceeded the vendee's pay-
ments. In the few Utah cases in which the vendee's payments
exceeded the vendor's damages, the court approved of restitu-
tion of the excess to the vendee."'
Florida cases also appear to impose a burden of showing un-
conscionability upon a vendee who prays for restitution. Unfor-
tunately, Florida courts have not been carefully analytic in artic-
ulating the relevant test and thus have made the availability of
restitution quite unpredictable. In Chace v. Johnson,2 for exam-
69. 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 1981).
70. One reason for the poor results for Utah vendees is that few Utah vendees rec-
ord their contracts. Those who do record and subsequently default can probably settle
with their vendors for at least the nuisance value of the suit which would be necessary to
clear the vendor's title, since the damages and restitution issues can always be litigated.
71. Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981); Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah
1976); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).
72. 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929).
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ple, the vendee was one year in default and sued to recover
money totaling eighty percent of the contract price. The Florida
Supreme Court ordered the vendor to return payments to the
vendee that exceeded the vendor's damages. On the other hand,
in Sawyer v. Marco Island Development Corp.,73 a Florida ap-
pellate court held that a vendee's interest could be extinguished
without return of the payments made. In that case, which in-
volved title to thirty-six lots, a vendor brought suit to remove
from the record the interests of several vendees. One of the
vendees was one year in default and had paid ninety percent of
the purchase price. None of the other vendees had paid over
twenty-five percent of the purchase price and they were repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem because they did not appear. The
vendee who had paid ninety percent of the purchase price, how-
ever, was personally represented. Despite the special circum-
stances of this last vendee, the court enforced forfeiture as to
everyone, observing:
We see a substantial difference between the unjust enrich-
ment which would result if a large deposit were forfeited
within a short period of time and a situation where a vendor
has removed his property from the market for several years
while the vendee abandons the contract by ceasing to make
further payments .... 74
The vendee's restitution remedy is perhaps best developed
in California. It should be noted first that, under the rule of
Venable v. Harmon5 a California vendor cannot receive a defi-
ciency judgment regardless of his loss. In addition, California
antiforfeiture cases compel the vendor to return to the vendee
any amount paid in excess of the vendor's damages. In Freed-
man v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish"' the California Supreme
Court held that it violated the public policies against forfeitures,
penalties, and unjust enrichment to deny restitution, even to a
vendee willfully in default.
However, determining the amount of restitution to which
the vendee is entitled has caused problems. Under the reasoning
73. 301 So. 2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 757 (Fla.
1975).
74. 301 So. 2d at 821. There was a vigorous dissent with respect to the purchawer
who had paid 90% of the price.
75. 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965) (based on Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
580b (West 1970)).
76. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
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of the California Supreme Court decision in Honey v. Henry's
Franchise Leasing Corp.,77 the vendor apparently has the option
of measuring his damages by either the "rental value" (giving
restitution of the amount by which the vendee's payments ex-
ceed the fair rental value of the property while the vendee was
in possession) or the "difference value" (giving restitution of the
amount by which the vendee's payments exceed the difference
between the current market value and the higher original con-
tract price). 78 Professor Hetland points out that "rarely over the
past few decades has the value of the property dropped so that
the vendor prefers difference value to his alternative mea-
sure-rental value. e79 The choice is the vendor's according to
Honey, because permitting the vendee to make it would in effect
give all installment vendees an option to convert their contracts
into leases-an advantage the court hardly thought appropriate
to give to a defaulter.
It is interesting to note that the economic results of the
"difference value" measure of restitution are roughly similar to
those of a judicial sale, in the sense that the market value of the
property is debited against the vendor's claim. Of course, the
two approaches are distinct, since in a restitution case the prop-
erty's value is measured by the court upon the testimony of wit-
nesses, rather than by a sale.80
77. 264 Cal. 2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 415 P.2d 833 (1966).
78. The court noted that since rescission was not sought by the vendor, the rental
value standard was inappropriate; the court consequently held that the proper calcula-
tion involved the difference value.
79. J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 52 (1974).
80. If the California Supreme Court's formulation of the "difference value" measure
of restitution is taken literally, then it seems subject to serious criticism. The problem
with the measure is illustrated by the following example.
Assume P buys property from V under an installment contract with the following
pertinent facts:
Purchase price = $30,000
Down payment = 2,000
Original debt = 28,000, 8% interest,
25-year maturity
Monthly payments = 216.11
Assume that default occurs after five years and that the value of the property has de-
clined, so that:
Value of property = $25,000.00
Balance on debt = 25,836.58 (based on standard
mortgage payment tables)
If foreclosure by judicial sale occurs, and if the costs of foreclosure are neglected and
the sale brings fair market value, the sale proceeds will be $25,000; V will be entitled to a
deficiency judgment of $836.58, assuming no antideficiency statute. (In California, no
[1985
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D. Foreclosure as a Mortgage
The trend of the cases discussed above is clearly toward ap-
plying mortgage concepts to aid vendees that default in land in-
such judgment will be permitted if a one-to-four-family house is involved. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1970).)
Suppose that V, instead of seeking foreclosure, elects to terminate P's rights under
the contract and to make restitution, as he is permitted to do under Honey. V must
restore to P all payments made in excess of V's loss. V elects the "difference value"
measure of loss.
Payments made = $14,966.60 ($216.11 per month x 60 months)
including $2000 down payment
(-) V's loss - 5,000.00 ($30,000 minus $25,000)
Restitution 9,966.60
Thus, instead of being entitled to a deficiency judgment, V must pay back to P
nearly $10,000. This is, to say the least, a strange result.
The problem is that the court, in computing the amount of restitution, has ignored
the "time value" of money. In a short-term marketing contract for $30,000, if P breaches
and V must remarket the property one month later for $25,000, it is reasonably accurate
to say that V's damages are $5,000. See Jensen v. Dalton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 654, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 426 (1970). If, however, the period between contract and breach is five years (dur-
ing which V has not had possession), the $5,000 damage figure is completely erroneous.
Let us recompute V's damages, but in doing so translate all amounts involved to a single
point in time by computing future values for each amount involved, using compound
interest tables. We may select any point in time we wish, but a convenient reference
point is the fifth anniversary of the sale-which happens to be the date of default. (This
is convenient because nothing of financial significance happens thereafter, and whatever
V's damages are on that date can easily be translated to their value on the date of judg-
ment simply by adding interest.)
In order to make translations of values to any given date, we must assume some
interest or discount rate. Let us use eight percent, since it is the figure selected by the
parties themselves when they initiated the transaction. Here is what actually happened:
Date
1-1-0 V gives up $30,000 asset,
receives $2,000 cash.
Future value of $28,000 as
of 1-1-5 = $41,715.66 (+)
2-1-0 V receives regular
through monthly payments of
1-1-5 $216.11. Future value of
$216.11 per month for 60
months = $15,879.08 (-)
1-1-5 V receives back the
property, worth $25,000 = $25,000.00 (-)
Subtracting what V received from
what he gave up, damages = $836.58
Thus, the "difference value" approach to restitution, properly computed, yields re-
sults exactly equal to a foreclosure sale. Of course, under California law, V cannot actu-
ally recover the $836.58 deficiency. Venable v. Harmon, 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 490 (1965).
No California case appears clearly to recognize the foregoing problem. Perhaps the
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stallment contracts. Indeed, in recent years an increasing num-
ber of courts have accepted this view. The logical conclusion of
this trend would be an absolute equivalency of installment con-
tracts and mortgages, with foreclosure becoming the exclusive
means by which a vendor could realize upon his security interest
in the property. For a court to take this position should hardly
seem surprising, for the judiciary reached the same conclusion
long ago with regard to other forms of mortgage substitutes."1
California cases actually include no direct holding that fore-
closure is a proper remedy in an installment contract default.
However, a California Supreme Court decision, Honey v.
Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp.,82 and an opinion by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co.,8 3
imply that a judicial sale would be appropriate if at least one of
the parties requested it. To date there is no California appellate
opinion in which either the vendee or the vendor sought a judi-
cial sale, and thus the language in the cases mentioned must be
regarded as dicta. Moreover, as our discussion of the Kosloff de-
cision indicates, 4 not all California appellate courts are even
willing to treat the installment land contract as a mortgage for
equity of redemption purposes. Nevertheless, as a practical mat-
ter, it seems safe to assume that if the issue were presented to it,
the California Supreme Court would conclude that vendee and
vendor alike have the right to foreclosure of a defaulted install-
ment land contract.
In Indiana the case for judicial sale is both better defined
and less dependent on the wishes of the parties. In Skendzel v.
Marshall5 the vendor sought a judicial declaration of forfeiture
closest is Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972), a "differ-
ence value" case in which the court refused to allow the vendees to claim, as part of their
"payments," the interest they had paid prior to default of deeds of trust they had as-
sumed. Id. at 756, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 325. Even this holding does not address the problem
systematically.
The "future value" problem is also raised in "rental value" restitution cases, but its
impact is relatively slight if the vendee's payments have been fairly regular prior to de-
fault and if they approximate the rental value of the property.
81. See NLSON & WHrrmA, supra note 3, §§ 3.4-3.25.
82. 64 Cal. 2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 415 P.2d 833 (1966). One other decision by the
California Supreme Court suggests the availability of foreclosure in the installment con-
tract context. See MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537, 488 P.2d 1353
(1971).
83. 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
84. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal
after remand, 264 Ind. 77, 339 N.E.2d 57 (1975).
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of a vendee's interest when the vendee had already paid $21,000
of a $36,000 contract price. The Indiana Supreme Court applied
the concept that "equity abhors a forfeiture" and held that en-
forcement of the forfeiture clause was "clearly excessive" and
"unreasonable." More significantly, however, the court treated
the installment land contract as a mortgage:
The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a
sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved
by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the ti-
tle by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage.
Realistically, vendor-vendee should be viewed as mortgagee-
mortgagor. To conceive of the relationship in different terms is
to pay homage to form over substance."
The court ordered that the contract be foreclosed judicially ac-
cording to Indiana mortgage procedure. While the court did not
absolutely rule out forfeiture in all cases, it did limit application
of forfeiture. Forfeiture is allowed only in cases of absconding or
abandoning vendees or in situations in which the vendee has
only paid a minimum amount and seeks to retain possession
while the vendor is making expenditures for taxes, insurance,
and maintenance.
Skendzel has been followed in several subsequent decisions
by Indiana appellate courts. For example, in Tidd v. Stauffer" a
defaulting vendee sought to obtain specific performance by pay-
ing the remaining balance when $16,000 out of a $39,000 con-
tract price had been paid. The Court of Appeals of Indiana
noted that forfeiture was inappropriate and directed the trial
court to order judicial foreclosure of the contract in the event
that the vendees failed promptly to pay the balance of the con-
tract price. In Fisel v. Yoder 88 a vendee in default who had paid
one-fourth of the purchase price was allowed to continue to
make payments on the contract; the vendor's request for forfei-
ture was denied. On the other hand, in Donaldson v. Sellmer89
the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed a trial court's award of
forfeiture to a vendor when the vendee had paid $7,000 out of a
$23,158 purchase price. In Donaldson the appellate court agreed
that the case fell within an exception to Skendzel in that the
86. 261 Ind. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 646.
87. 159 Ind. App. 570, 308 N.E.2d 415 (1974).
88. 162 Ind. App. 565, 320 N.E.2d 783 (1975).
89. 166 Ind. App. 60, 333 N.E.2d 862 (1975).
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vendee "had wholly failed to perform his obligation to acquire
adequate insurance and had allowed the property to deteriorate
to such an extent that substantial repair was necessary before
the house should even be habitable."' 0 Similarly, a trial court's
forfeiture decree was sustained when less than ten percent of the
principal balance of $275,000 had been paid and the vendees
had failed to keep the property insured or pay real estate
taxes.9 1
Thus in Indiana, installment land contracts are now treated
as mortgages in most instances in which the defaulting vendee
has a substantial equity. Because of the exceptions noted above,
Skendzel does not go as far judicially as Oklahoma went legisla-
tively in converting installment land contracts into mortgages.
Nonetheless, the case is one of the clearest judicial statements to
date of that principle. 2
The Indiana approach was adopted by an intermediate New
York appellate court in Bean v. Walker.93 In that case the tardy
vendees had paid almost half of the original $15,000 principal
amount on an installment land contract for the sale of a house.
Moreover, the vendees had substantially improved the property.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, perceiving
"no reason why [these] vendees should be treated any differ-
ently than the mortgagor at common law," reversed a trial court
forfeiture decree and held that the "vendors may not summarily
dispossess the vendees of their equitable ownership without first
bringing an action to foreclose the vendees' equity of redemp-
tion. '94 The court, however, qualified its holding by specifically
adopting the Skendzel limitations on the availability of the fore-
closure remedy.
Perhaps the most straight-forward acceptance of the view
90. Id. at 66, 333 N.E.2d at 866. In Goff v. Graham, 159 Ind. App. 324, 306 N.E.2d
758 (1974), forfeiture of an installment land contract was upheld because evidence
showed that the vendee had failed to insure as required by the contract, had committed
waste, and had deliberately neglected the property. The vendee had paid a down pay-
ment of $1,950 and one monthly payment of $562.62 on a contract price of $61,750 amor-
tized over 20 years.
91. Phillips v. Nay,- Ind. App. -, 456 N.E.2d 745 (1983).
92. For analysis of the Indiana situation, see Bepko, Contracts and Commercial
Law, 8 IND. L. REV. 116, 117-20 (1974); Polston, Survey of Recent Developments in Indi-
ana Law-Property, 10 IND. L. REV. 297, 298 n.4 (1976); Strausbaugh, Exorcising the
Forfeiture Clause From Real Estate Conditional Sales Contracts, 4 REAL EST. L. J. 71
(1975).
93. 95 A.D.2d 70, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1983).
94. Id. at 74, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
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that the installment land contract should be deemed a mortgage
for remedy purposes is Sebastian v. Floyd.95 In Floyd the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court reversed a trial court forfeiture determina-
tion where the defaulting vendee had paid $4,300, or nearly forty
percent of the principal balance, on an installment land contract
for the sale of a house. The court noted a "modern trend. . . to
treat land sale contracts as analogous to conventional mortgages,
thus requiring a seller to seek a judicial sale of the property
upon the buyer's default."98 Accordingly the court was of the
opinion that
[A] rule treating the seller's interest as a lien will best protect
the interests of both buyer and seller. Ordinarily, the seller will
receive the balance due on the contract, plus expenses, thus
fulfilling the expectations he had when he agreed to sell his
land. In addition, the buyer's equity in the property will be
protected.17
Although the court cited Skendzel with approval, its opinion
contained none of the limitations on the foreclosure remedy sug-
gested by the Indiana decision. 98
While conceptually muddled, the current Florida situation
at a practical level seems relatively clear. While there appears to
be no clear-cut holding of the Florida Supreme Court that in-
stallment land contracts must be treated as a mortgage or that a
vendee has a right to insist on judicial foreclosure, Florida case
law recognizes a tardy vendee's right to redemption or specific
performance.9 9 Not only do numerous Florida cases state in a
variety of contexts that the installment land contract is a mort-
gage,100 but vendors routinely seem to treat them as such by
choosing to foreclose them as mortgages.0 1 Consequently, it
95. 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
96. Id. at 383.
97. Id.
98. Recent Idaho judicial attempts to apply mortgage law concepts to installment
land contract are perplexing. Compare Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334
(1977) (affirming a trial court forfeiture decree) with Thomas v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105, 577
P.2d 1153 (1978) (reversing a trial court decree of forfeiture and ordering the trial court
to conduct a judicial sale of the contract property). See also McEnroe v. Morgan, 106
Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (trial court determination that forfeiture
was not unconscionable affirmed).
99. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
100. See cases cited supra note 50.
101. See, e.g., Ricard v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 462 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing right to deficiency judgment); Ernest v. Carter 368 So. 2d
428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Parise v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 438 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. Dist.
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seems that Florida has joined the ranks of jurisdictions classify-
ing installment land contracts as mortgages, at least for remedial
purposes.
This movement will probably continue, especially in states
in which there is little or no statutory regulation of land con-
tracts. The same factors that induced the courts to treat other
mortgage substitutes as mortgages-particularly the desperate
borrower's willingness to sign anything presented to him and the
potential for a harsh and unwarranted loss of his investment as
a consequence of his default-should and almost certainly will
be increasingly persuasive in the installment land contract
context.
It is sometimes argued that this trend is undesirable and
that it is socially advantageous for the law to provide an ex-
tremely quick and cheap method for a vendor to terminate the
vendee's interest in real estate upon default. Such a procedure,
it is said, encourages extension of credit to individuals whose
credit-worthiness is so poor that they would otherwise be unable
to transact. However, this argument has two errors. First, the
cases discussed above illustrate that no vendor can count on for-
feiture under a installment land contract as being either quick
or cheap; indeed, it is an invitation to litigation. Second, no pro-
cedure, however quick or cheap, can be justified if it amounts to
foul play.
The solution, of course, is not for the law to ignore the legit-
imate needs of installment land contract vendees, but to reform
the modes of foreclosure commonly used for mortgages to make
them as inexpensive and rapid as feasible, consistent with the
requirement of fairness and due process. If this is done, install-
ment land contracts-if they continue to exist at all-can be
brought within the ambit of the more efficient mortgage foreclo-
sure proceedings, and no one will have cause to complain. Per-
haps the growing tendency of courts to treat land contracts as
mortgages will bring pressure on state legislatures to accomplish
needed reform of mortgage law.
In light of the judicial trend outlined above, we must ask
why installment land contracts continue to be used. The ques-
tion is particularly perplexing in those states in which relatively
rapid nonjudicial foreclosure is available for mortgages or deeds
of trust. The reason given several years ago by Professor Warren
Ct. App. 1983).
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may still apply: "[T]he vendor continues to use the installment
sale contract despite its deficiencies with regard to remedies be-
cause he is willing to gamble that the vendee's rights under this
device will never be asserted and his own contractual advantages
will not be challenged. ' 102 In addition, it is possible that most
vendors and real estate brokers do not accurately perceive the
risks of litigation that land contracts present. Whatever the
motivations of vendors, it is clear that the risks are inflating
rapidly.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FORFEITURE
In recent years power of sale mortgage and deed of trust
foreclosure procedures have been increasingly attacked as violat-
ing the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
constitutional questions presented by these attacks may be
raised as well in the context of installment land contracts. At-
tacks on foreclosure procedures have focused on two aspects of
the process: notice and hearing.103 Many power of sale statutes
do not provide for any notice, or only notice by publication or
posting, to the debtor and junior lienors.10 4 In addition, the stat-
utes usually make no provision at all for a hearing, either before
or after foreclosure. If the due process clause applies to the fore-
closure process, many statutes clearly violate the standard ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.,' 05 since the notice they provide is "not rea-
sonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed
by other means at hand."' 0 6 The hearing standard is not quite so
102. Warren, California Installment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9
UCLA L. REv. 608, 633 (1962).
103. See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 3, §§ 7.19-7.30; see also Leen, Galbraith &
Gant, Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange Bedfellows?, 48 WASH. L. REv. 763
(1973); Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure Under Powers of Sale, 28 J. Mo. B. 428
(1972); Pedowitz, Current Developments in Summary Foreclosure, 9 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR J. 421, 425-31 (1974); Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Trustee's
Sale, 61 CALE. L. REV. 1282 (1973); Comment, Due Process Problems of Mississippi
Power of Sale Foreclosure, 47 Miss. L.J. 67 (1976); Comment, Notice Requirements of
the Non-judicial Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1110 (1973); Comment, Power of Sale
Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHL L. REv. 206, 220 (1972).
104. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-715 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (1972); cf.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.03 (West 1947) (personal service on person in possession only).
105. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
106. Id. at 319. This conclusion has been reached in three mortgage foreclosure
cases. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn,
389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Law v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 366 F.
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clear, but there is a strong possibility that the total absence of a
presale hearing would also be held unconstitutional. 10
While application of these due process standards to install-
ment land contract forfeitures is somewhat uncertain, several
observations are appropriate. Many contract forms do provide
for direct mail notice to the vendee as a prerequisite to forfei-
ture, and this would certainly meet the Mullane standard; 05
however, as in the case of mortgages, a contract procedure that
provides only publication notice or the like would not.
The hearing issue is more difficult. Installment land con-
tracts themselves almost never provide for a hearing. Moreover,
state statutory termination procedures rarely require a
pretermination hearing, and those that do may still be constitu-
tionally deficient. For example, the Minnesota statute specifi-
cally authorizes a trial court to issue, prior to contract termina-
tion, temporary injunctive relief at the vendee's request against
further termination proceedings. 09 The vendee may plead af-
firmatively "any matter that would constitute a defense to an
action to terminate the contract." 0 If the constitutional hearing
requirement is satisfied by legislation that authorizes the vendee
to request a hearing, then the foregoing statute meets such a
standard. On the other hand, the statute may still be constitu-
tionally suspect if the hearing must be triggered automatically
by the contract termination itself."'
Whether it will ever be necessary for the contract forfeiture
process to withstand scrutiny on the merits of the due process
Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Contra Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610
(11th Cir. 1984). See also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983)
(notice by publication and posting fails to provide mortgagee with minimum notice re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment in a proceeding to sell mortgaged real estate for
nonpayment of taxes).
107. See United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Ricker v.
United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974); rev'd on
other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Guidarelli v. Lazaretti, 305 Minn.
551, 233 N.W.2d 890 (1975).
108. Junior liens may, of course, be created by contract vendees. For example, a
vendee may mortgage his contract interest. If such an interest exists and is recorded or
otherwise readily identifiable by the vendor, failure of the vendor to provide notice to
the junior lienor may raise the same due process issues as in the analogous first mortgage
foreclosure situation. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
109. MNNN. STAT. ANN. § 559.211 (West Supp. 1985).
110. Id.
111. See NELsON & WHrrMN, supra note 3, § 7.25.
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clause is questionable. Two defenses raised, often successfully,
by power of sale mortgagees appear to similarly apply to the in-
stallment land contract situation. The first is waiver. If the con-
tract itself contains language by which the vendee authorizes a
forfeiture action by the vendor without notice or hearing, can
the vendee later be heard to complain that his constitutional
rights were violated? In related contexts, the Supreme Court has
held that the efficacy of such a contractual waiver depends on a
variety of factors, including the specificity of the waiver, the rel-
ative equality of bargaining power of the parties, the sophistica-
tion of the waiving party and perhaps whether the waiver was
part of a printed contract. 112 Obviously each case must be liti-
gated upon its facts but in the typical installment land contract
transaction the waiver is probably not very explicit, is part of
the printed form, and is generally not a point of negotiation.
Consequently, often the vendee will be able to make a colorable
argument that the purported waiver does not bind him.
The second defense that power of sale mortgagees have as-
serted in constitutional litigation is that no state action is in-
volved in such foreclosures. State action is, of course, a prerequi-
site to applicability of the fourteenth amendment; if non-judicial
foreclosure is deemed a purely private process, no federal due
process standard need be met. The plaintiffs in these cases have
sought to show the presence of state action, pointing out that in
most states in which power of sale foreclosure is widely em-
ployed it is authorized and regulated by statute. A few early
cases found state action to be present," 3 but the clear trend of
recent decisions is against such a finding."" No Supreme Court
112. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972);
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Mortgage foreclosure cases re-
jecting the mortgagee's waiver argument include Rau v. Cavenaugh, 500 F. Supp. 204
(D.S.D. 1980); Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Black-
burn, 389 F. Supp 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Law v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); cf. Huggins v. Dement, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412 (provision in deed
for foreclosure upon default found to constitute sufficient notice for due process require-
ments), appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071
(1972); see Comment, Notice Requirements of the Non-judicial Foreclosure Sale, 51
N.C. L. REV. 1110 (1973).
113. See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Northrip v. Fed-
eral Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). Turner relies heavily upon the rather peculiar participation
of the clerk of the court in nonjudicial foreclosures under the then-applicable North Car-
olina statute.
114. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Bar-
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decision has yet been rendered on the point, but the Supreme
Court will probably find that state action is absent in the typical
power of sale mortgage foreclosure.
While few state action cases exist in the installment land
contract termination setting,"1 5 one federal decision is instruc-
tive. In Staley Farms, Inc. v. Rueter"6 a contract vendee chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Iowa statutory forfeiture pro-
cedure on the ground that it failed to provide a hearing prior to
forfeiture. The vendee argued that state action was present be-
cause the statute "encouraged" deprivation of constitutional
rights and delegated a traditionally public function to private
parties. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected both arguments and affirmed the trial court's deter-
mination that state action did not exist. According to the Eighth
Circuit, the encouragement theory lacked merit because the
Iowa statute did not compel the vendor to use it. Likewise, the
public function concept did not apply because the statute was
not the exclusive method of resolving such contract disputes. Fi-
nally, the court noted that "there is no overt official involvement
required through [the Iowa statute].""'
The Staley Farms result and reasoning have obvious impli-
cations for nonstatutory forfeiture as well. While states through
their court systems and case law superintend forfeitures gener-
ally, they surely are no less involved in the statutory termination
setting. Thus, if state action is absent when state legislation spe-
cifically authorizes a contract forfeiture proceeding, it seems
even more clearly absent when such contracts and their reme-
dies are regulated exclusively by case law.
VI. THE DEED IN ESCROW AS AN AID TO VENDOR FORFEITURE
REMEDY
Vendors frequently attempt to avoid pro-vendee case law
and obviate title problems incident to vendee recording of in-
rera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Y Aleman Corp. v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 414 F. Supp. 93 (D. Guam 1975); Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp.
1072 (D. Ariz. 1976); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Global Indus.,
Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Howl-
ett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 909 (1975).
115. See Aldape v. Lubke, 107 Idaho 316, 688 P.2d 1221 (1984); Staley Farms, Inc.
v. Rueter, 662 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1981); Jensen v. Schreck 275 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1979).
116. 662 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1981).
117. Id. at 522.
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stallment land contracts by utilizing a deed in escrow arrange-
ment. Under this procedure the vendee is typically required at
the time of execution of an installment land contract to deliver
to an escrow agent an executed quitclaim deed to the real estate.
If the vendee defaults, the vendor notifies the escrow agent, who
is authorized by the escrow agreement to record the deed.118 Ide-
ally, from the vendor's perspective the recording of a quitclaim
deed not only terminates the vendee's interest, but also clears
up any title cloud created by the earlier vendee recording the
contract.
The advantages of the foregoing procedure to the vendor
may be more apparent than real. If a mortgagor executes and
delivers a deed conveying the mortgaged real estate to the mort-
gagee in a regular mortgage transaction, the deed will be deemed
a clog on the mortgagor's equity of redemption and hence inva-
lid and unenforceable. 1 9 The clogging doctrine may be as read-
ily applied when the financing device is an installment land con-
tract rather than a mortgage. To the extent a jurisdiction treats
a contract for deed as a mortgage and the vendee as owning an
equity of redemption, it may simply characterize the vendee's
contemporaneous quitclaim deed as an invalid attempt to clog
the vendee-mortgagor's equity of redemption. This escrow ar-
rangement frequently succeeds, not due to its inherent substan-
tive soundness but because defaulting vendees fail to assert their
rights and many title examiners for subsequent purchasers from
the vendor simply do not fully appreciate the implications of the
anticlogging doctrine in this context.
VII. OTHER REMEDIES FOR VENDORS
If installment land contracts were governed exclusively by
mortgage law, the vendor's remedies in the event of vendee de-
fault would be both clearly defined and relatively simple. The
vendor could choose to foreclose the contract and, if less than
the contract price is obtained at the foreclosure sale and an-
tideficiency legislation 2 ° is not a problem, seek a deficiency
judgment against the vendee for the difference. Alternatively, if
118. See, e.g., In re Mancha, 35 Bankr. 427 (9th Cir. 1983); McEnroe v. Morgan, 106
Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
119. See NELSON & Wwrm, supra note 3, § 3.1.
120. See id. §§ 8.1-8.3; Ricard v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 462 So. 2d 592
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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the contract imposed personal liability for the contract amount
on the vendee, the vendor could sue on the contract debt and
attempt to collect any judgment obtained from the vendee's
other assets, including the contract land.
Unfortunately, in few, if any, jurisdictions will the vendor's
remedies be that clear. In some jurisdictions the installment
land contract is still largely regarded as a contract and, as such,
is governed primarily by contract principles.' 2 ' In others, courts
apply an often confusing amalgam of contract and mortgage
law.122 This "split personality" often exists even in those states
that have taken the greatest strides123 in treating the installment
land contract as a mortgage because the courts in those jurisdic-
tions have yet to confront the myriad issues and implications
that the mortgage characterization ultimately creates.
Whatever the conceptual basis, vendors may well have a va-
riety of nonforfeiture remedies against a defaulting vendee.
While such remedies have traditionally received little attention
because of pervasive emphasis on the forfeiture remedy, as the
latter remedy becomes less reliable, alternatives will receive
more attention. The following material explores the analytical
underpinnings of these remedies and practical considerations in-
cident to their use.
A. Specific Performance for the Price
Under the specific performance for the price remedy, the
vendor chooses to treat the installment land contract like an ear-
nest money contract. The vendor tenders title to the land and
seeks an order requiring the vendee to pay the remainder of the
contract purchase price. While many courts will grant specific
performance to the vendor under such circumstances, 4 a few,
like the minority of courts in the earnest money contract con-
121. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cape, 100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983); Nygaard
v. Anderson, 229 Or. 323, 366 P.2d 899 (1961); Park Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65
(Utah 1981); Stonebraker v. Zinn, 286 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1982).
122. Compare Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977) with Thomas
v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105, 577 P.2d 1153 (1978).
123. See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., SAS Partnership v. Schafer, - Mont. - , 653 P.2d 834 (1982);
Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc., 182 Mont. 389, 597 P.2d 689 (1979); Renard v.
Allen, 237 Or. 406, 391 P.2d 777 (1964).
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text,125 require the vendor to show that the remedy at law is
inadequate. 126
However, the specific performance remedy is conceptually
more problematic in the installment land contract setting than
in the earnest money contract situation. An earnest money con-
tract typically contemplates payment of the balance of the con-
tract price on one closing date. In contrast, the installment land
contract, as a financing device, is paid in installments over a
long period of time. If an earnest money vendee defaults on the
closing date, a suit for the full contract price seems conceptually
uncomplicated. On the other hand, when an installment land
contract vendee defaults, it is more difficult to envisage a suit
for more than the installments actually in default. Consequently,
a vendee could argue that a condition precedent to specific per-
formance for the balance of the contract price should be an ac-
celeration clause allowing the vendor to declare the entire con-
tract amount due and payable upon vendee breach. In the
absence of such a clause, the vendor conceivably could be left
with the undesirable option of suing only for the past due in-
stallments plus interest. In any event, it is prudent for the ven-
dor to include an acceleration clause in installment land
contracts.
When specific performance is available, a vendor normally
would use it when the vendee has assets to satisfy a judgment
for the price and the land is worth less than the contract price.
In this relatively rare situation, the forfeiture remedy should be
avoided because the election of remedies rule may prevent any
further relief against the vendee. Specific performance, on the
other hand, would entail a judgment for the full price which
would be collectible by judicial sale of any or all of the vendee's
assets, including the contract real estate.12
B. Foreclosure by Sale of the Vendee's Rights
When permitted, foreclosure by sale of the vendee's rights
allows the vendor to treat the installment land contract as a
mortgage and results in a judicial sale of the land. If the sale
125. See Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 128 N.J. Super. 385, 320 A.2d 194 (1974);
Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966).
126. See, e.g., Williamson v. Magnusson, 336 N.W.2d 353 (N.D, 1983).
127. See Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc. 182 Mont. 389, 597 P.2d 689
(1979).
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brings more than the contract price, the surplus will go to the
vendee. If the sale yields less than the contract amount, a defi-
ciency judgment against the vendee often is available. In states
that have opted to equate the installment land contract with the
mortgage, the vendor may be required to pursue the foreclosure
remedy.12 s In states in which the mortgage status of the install-
ment land contract is less clear, courts are often willing to allow
the vendor to utilize the foreclosure remedy.129 In still other ju-
risdictions, however, the vendor's ability to choose the foreclo-
sure remedy seems more doubtful in that the vendor would be
seeking a mortgage remedy under a device governed by contract
law. In such situations it is advisable to include in the install-
ment land contract itself language specifically affording the ven-
dor the foreclosure option.
C. Strict Foreclosure
A number of states, including some with no tradition of
foreclosing installment contracts by sale, will award strict fore-
closure1 30 to a vendor in an installment land contract.131 The ef-
fect of this remedy is much like a judicial declaration of forfei-
ture: the contract is canceled and the vendor's title to the land is
confirmed. 132 However, it differs from forfeiture in that the court
will fix a redemption period within which the vendee and assign-
ees1 33 of the vendee's interest may specifically enforce the con-
128. See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Ulander v. Allen, 37 Colo. App. 279, 544 P.2d 1001 (1976); Mustard v.
Sugar Valley Lakes, 7 Kan. App. 2d 340, 642 P.2d 111 (1981); Ryan v. Kolterman, 215
Neb. 355, 338 N.W.2d 747 (1983); Lamont v. EvJen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973).
See generally Annot., 77 A.LR. 270 (1932).
130. For a more extended discussion of strict foreclosure in the mortgage context,
see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, §§ 7.9-7.10.
131. See, e.g., Canterbury Court, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 224 Kan. 493, 582 P.2d 261
(1978); Ryan v. Kolterman, 215 Neb. 355, 338 N.W.2d 747 (1983); Swaggart v. McLean,
38 Or. App. 207, 589 P.2d 1170 (1979); Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d
647, 142 N.W.2d 212 (1966). See generally Randolph, Updating the Oregon Installment
Land Contract, 15 WILLAMETr L.J. 181, 211-13 (1979); Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure of
Land Contracts, 14 MINN. L. REV. 342 (1930); Annot., supra note 129. Some courts rou-
tinely give strict foreclosure without calling it such; they simply award a "grace period"
for the purchaser to pay the contract, and declare a forfeiture if he or she does not do so.
See Jesz v. Geigle, 319 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1982); Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35
Wash. 2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) (grace period discretionary).
132. Some cases explicitly treat forfeiture and strict foreclosure as alternatives avail-
able to the vendor. See Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962);
Zumstein v. Stockton, 199 Or. 633, 264 P.2d 455 (1953).
133. See, e.g., Westfair Corp. v. Kuelz, 90 Wis. 2d 631, 280 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. Ct.
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tract by tendering the balance due.1 - The contract will be can-
celed only if the vendee or his assignees do not tender the
balance due. Because strict foreclosure, like forfeiture, deprives
the vendee of any "equity" he or she may have accumulated in
the property, some courts will award it only upon a showing that
the land has no value in excess of the contract balance.1 35 If
there is excess value, some courts will decree a judicial sale
instead. 3 '
D. Suit for Damages
Another remedy arguably available to the vendor is an ac-
tion for damages. 13 7 The vendor's damages will probably be mea-
sured by the difference between the contract price and the fair
market value of the land as of the date of the vendee's breach,
the standard normally applied in earnest money contract set-
tings."3 s Pursuit of this remedy, however, is only possible when
the vendee has abandoned the land. When the forfeiture remedy
is necessary to regain the land, the damages action will probably
be barred by the election of remedies doctrine. Moreover, the
vendor faces the unenviable prospect of having to convince a
court or jury that the land was worth less on the date of the
breach than the contract price. Obviously, if the vendee has as-
sets to satisfy a judgment, the vendor would be better off to sue
for specific performance for the price or to seek to foreclose the
contract as a mortgage. If the foreclosure sale yields less than
App. 1979) (assignee of mechanics' lienor against vendee has right to redeem in strict
foreclosure proceeding).
134. A further distinction exists. If the vendor declares a forfeiture, and subse-
quently demands or accepts payments on the contract, the court may treat his behavior
as inconsistent with the forfeiture and hence as waiving it. On the other hand, accept-
ance of payments is entirely consistent with a vendor's demand for strict foreclosure,
since until the end of the redemption period fixed by the court, the purchaser has every
right to attempt to pay off the contract. See Heisel v. Cunningham, 94 Idaho 461, 491
P.2d 178 (1971).
135. Ryan v. Kolterman, 215 Neb. 355, 338 N.W.2d 747 (1983); State Sec. Co. v.
Daringer, 206 Neb. 427, 293 N.W.2d 102 (1980).
136. Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962); Blondell v. Beam,
243 Or. 293, 413 P.2d 397 (1966).
137. See Nemec v. Rolo, 114 Ariz. 589, 562 P.2d 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
138. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. W rrmAN, PROPERTY § 10.3 (1984).
Note that the time value of money must be taken into account in order to avoid unfair
results in computing damages. See supra note 80.
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the contract price, the vendor can usually obtain a deficiency
judgment.139
E. Election of Remedies Problem
To the extent that a jurisdiction recognizes forfeiture as a
valid remedy, a vendor faces an election of remedies problem.
Once forfeiture has been accomplished, the vendor typically is
barred from seeking to recover the equivalent of a mortgage de-
ficiency judgment.140 Suppose, for example, that under an in-
stallment land contract the total purchase price was $50,000, of
which the vendee paid $5,000 in cash at the date of contract exe-
cution and agreed to pay the balance in nine equal annual in-
stallments of $5,000, together with accrued interest at twelve
percent per annum. Suppose further that the vendee never
makes a further payment on the contract and that the vendor
chooses to invoke forfeiture. Later the vendor discovers that the
land is worth only $30,000. Under the election of remedies doc-
trine the vendor cannot collect from the vendee the difference
between the balance due on the contract ($45,000) and the fair
market value of the land. Moreover, the same result will be
reached even when the contract obligation to the vendor is evi-
denced by a separate promissory note.' 4 ' Occasionally a state
will reject the election of remedies doctrine but reach the same
result on the ground that it "flows from the fact that the con-
tract between the parties has been terminated, thereby extin-
guishing any right to recover the unpaid purchase price.' 42
Some state statutes ameliorate the vendor's election of rem-
edies problem by authorizing, in certain limited circumstances,
an award of damages to the vendor even though a contract ter-
mination election has already been made. For example, the Ohio
termination statute provides that even though a judgment for
cancellation of the contract has taken place, a damage award
may be entered against the vendee if the latter "has paid an
amount less than the fair rental value plus deterioration or de-
139. See Ricard v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 462 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc. 182 Mont. 389, 597 P.2d 689 (1979).
140. See Zirinsky v. Sheehan, 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969); Nemec v. Rolo, 114 Ariz.
589, 562 P.2d 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Langenes v. Bullinger, 328 N.W.2d 241 (N.D.
1982); Butler v. Michel, 14 Ohio App. 3d 116, 470 N.E.2d 217 (1984); Trans West Co. v.
Teuscher, 27 Wash. App. 404, 618 P.2d 1023 (1980).
141. See Nemec v. Rollo, 114 Ariz. 589, 562 P.2d 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
142. Gray v. Bowers, 332 N.W.2d 323, 325 (Iowa 1983).
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struction of the property occasioned by the vendee's use."143 In
addition, a court may ameliorate the harshness of the election of
remedies rule by its determination of when the election took
place. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that
"while the [vendor] may not accept or take possession and still
seek money damages, he may, even after sending notice of forfei-
ture, refuse tender of possession and either commence an action
for money damages or for foreclosure of the land contract."'44
VIII. TITLE PROBLEMS FOR VENDEES
When a person purchases property under an installment
land contract, the chances of title problems with respect to the
vendee's interest are greater than if the transaction were cast as
a purchase money mortgage. Even in those jurisdictions that
have reduced the impact of the forfeiture provision by statute or
judicial decision, a vendee may still have problems with his or
her title.
In the usual purchase money mortgage situation, the pur-
chaser will likely examine the seller's title and require that it be
marketable. Even if the purchaser is not sophisticated enough to
have the title checked, any third party lender involved in th
transaction will insist upon a title insurance policy or at least
upon an attorney's title opinion as evidence that the seller's title
is good. On the other hand, in installment land contract situa-
tions the vendor's title will likely not be examined at the time
the contract is executed. There usually is no third party lender
to insist upon title examination-the vendor serves that eco-
nomic function-and the vendor is not likely to insist that his
own title be examined. Moreover, many installment land con-
tract vendees have low incomes and either cannot afford a title
examination or do not recognize the need for it. Accordingly,
many vendees may unknowingly execute the contract, take pos-
session, and make substantial installment payments when in fact
the vendor's title is encumbered by mortgages, judgment liens,
143. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (Page 1981). For an interpretation of this provi-
sion, see Marvin v. Stemen, 68 Ohio App. 2d 26, 426 N.E.2d 205 (1980); see also Durham,
supra note 30.
144. Gruskin v. Fisher, 405 Mich. 51, 57-58, 273 N.W.2d 893, 896 (1979). Moreover,
at least one court has rejected the election rule entirely in the installment land contract
context and has substituted for it an estoppel concept. See Keesee v. Fetzek, 106 Idaho
507, 681 P.2d 600 (Ida. App. 1984).
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or other interests perfected prior to the execution of the
contract.145
The recording act can also cause substantial problems for an
installment land contract vendee. In the usual purchase money
mortgage transaction, the deed to the mortgagor and the mort-
gage or deed of trust will be recorded almost immediately. If
there is no third party lender, the purchaser will record his deed
as a matter of custom. Any third party lender involved will insist
upon and carry out immediate recordation in order to protect
itself against subsequent interests and encumbrances that may
be created by or rise against the mortgagor. This recording by
the mortgagee will also protect the mortgagor against any subse-
quent interests arising through the former owner of the land. On
the other hand, in the installment land contract situation there
is no third party to stimulate prompt recording. Many unsophis-
ticated vendees do not record and may be prevented from re-
cording by acts of the vendor.14 6 Since vendors anticipate a high
default rate among vendees, it is in the vendor's interest that
the contracts not be recorded so that the vendor may quickly
resell to other purchasers without the necessity of a judicial pro-
ceeding to remove a title cloud posed by a recorded contract.147
Suppose, for instance, that after executing the contract, a
vendor either mortgages the land or sells it to another. While it
is true in many jurisdictions that possession by the original ven-
dee will constitute constructive notice to those dealing with the
land thereafter and thus will be the equivalent of recording, 148
this is not universally the case.149 Further, even if possession is
constructive notice, establishing the existence of possession
could require litigation,150 while the fact of a recorded document
would not.151
145. See generally Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A. Study of Low Income
Transactions, With Proposals for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Owner-
ship in the Inner City, 7 Hous. L. REv. 523, 545-46 (1970).
146. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
147. See Mixon, supra note 145, at 547.
148. See Life Savings & Loan Ass'n of America v. Bryant, - Ill. App. 3d -,
467 N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (1984); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WHITMAN, PROPERTY
§ 11.10 n.33 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889); Comment, Possession
as Notice Under Missouri Recording Act, 16 Mo. L. REv. 142 (1951).
150. See, e.g., Beals v. Cryer, 99 IlM. App. 3d 842, 426 N.E.2d 253 (1981) (vendee's
mowing of grass and weeds insufficient "visible, open, exclusive and unambiguous" evi-
dence of possession so as to be the equivalent of recording).
151. Failure to record an installment land contract may also cause problems for the
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Recent bankruptcy law changes make vendor bankruptcy
significantly less troublesome for the vendee than under prior
law. Suppose, for example, that four years into a ten-year in-
stallment land contract, the vendor files a bankruptcy petition.
Section 70(b) of the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act (the "Prior Act")
provided that "the trustee shall assume or reject an executory
contract." 152 Because of the rule of In re New York Investors
Mutual Group, Inc.,153 this statutory provision presented serious
problems for a vendee. In that case, an installment land contract
vendee contended that it was entitled to specific performance
against the bankruptcy trustee who had disaffirmed the contract
under the above statute. The vendee contended that disaffirm-
ance divested it of its equitable title to the land. However, the
court concluded that any rights of the vendee originated solely
in the contract and that section 70(b) did not exclude contracts
for the sale of real estate from the trustee's power to reject exec-
utory contracts.
Professor Warren commented that application of the New
York Investors rule would leave an installment land contract
vendee "with a claim for damages instead of a home.' 54 Despite
this criticism, subsequent decisions followed New York Inves-
tors.15 5 Scholarly commentary emphasized that the contracts in
the foregoing cases may have been executory or earnest money
contracts rather than true installment land contracts, ' 5  but
vendee when the vendor goes into bankruptcy. Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
authorizes a bankruptcy trustee in his status as a hypothetical lien creditor to take ad-
vantage of state recording statutes to defeat an unrecorded interest. If, under state law,
such a contract is recordable (and they generally are) and an unrecorded interest is inva-
lid against creditors who obtain a judgment lien without notice of the unrecorded inter-
est, a bankruptcy trustee may be able under section 544(a) to avoid the contract. In re
Sayre Village Manor, 120 F. Supp. 215 (D.N.J. 1954); Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REv. 477, 493-97 (1974); Lynn, Bankruptcy and the Land
Sales Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vis-a-Vis the Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee,
5 Tax. TcH L. REv. 677, 694-99 (1974). Normally, however, possession will be the
equivalent of recording. See Lacy, supra, at 496. In some states where possession is not
constructive notice, however, a nonrecording vendee in possession may be vulnerable
under section 70(c).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
153. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
154. Warren, supra note 102, at 613.
155. See Gulf Petroleum v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Philadelphia
Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960).
156. Lacy, supra note 151, at 483.
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there was general concern that the principle of New York Inves-
tors applied to the latter type of contract. 157
Section 365(i) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978158 (the
"Bankruptcy Code") resolved the above problem in favor of the
installment land contract vendee. While the Bankruptcy Code
continues to afford the trustee the right to assume or reject ex-
ecutory contracts,159 when the vendee is in possession the trus-
tee's right to reject the contract is subject to the vendee's right
to obtain legal title by completing the payments under the con-
tract. L60 When the vendee is not in possession, the trustee is able
to reject the contract and leave the vendee with a claim for dam-
ages for breach.16 1 While the vendee in this latter situation has a
lien on the contract property to the extent of prior payments
under the contract, he has the status of an unsecured creditor
for purposes of recovering other damages.6 2 Since most install-
ment land contract vendees normally are in possession, the
Bankruptcy Code thus rejects the implications of New York In-
vestors for most installment land contracts. On the other hand,
with respect to the usual earnest money contract, in which the
seller retains possession, and the relatively uncommon install-
ment land contract in which the vendor retains possession, the
Bankruptcy Code seems to codify the New York Investors
result.163
Federal tax liens against the vendor should no longer be a
problem for the prudent vendee who has a title examined prior
to contract execution and who has recorded the contract. If the
vendor is delinquent in payment of federal taxes, the United
States may obtain a lien on "all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to [the delinquent tax-
157. See id. at 481; Power, supra note 9, at 413; Lynn, supra note 151, at 689.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1982).
159. Id. § 365(a).
160. Id. § 365(i). Interestingly, courts have held that an installment land contract is
not an "executory contract" in situations in which the vendee is the bankrupt. Thus the
vendor will not be able to compel the vendee-bankrupt to assume or reject the contract.
See In re Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. 780 (D. Minn. 1983); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53 (D. Utah
1982).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1982).
162. Id. § 365(j).
163. Courts continue to experience difficulty with the meaning of "executory con-
tract." See, e.g., In re Summit Land Co., 13 Bankr. 310 (D. Utah 1981). For a considera-
tion of the latter problem, what constitutes possession, and other problems under section
365, see Comment, Installment Land Contracts and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act, 49 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1984).
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payer]."164 The tax lien is ineffective against "any purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien
creditor until notice thereof . . . has been filed"'165 in a desig-
nated place. Thus, if a grantee recorded a conveyance of the tax-
payer-grantor's property for adequate and full consideration
prior to the filing of a tax lien and without actual knowledge of
the lien, the grantee's title would not be encumbered by the lien.
A fortiori, if the lien arose after the conveyance, the grantee is
protected.
Before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Tax Lien Act,
however, there was case law indicating that a vendee who had
taken possession under an installment land contract, but who
had not received legal title, did not come within the statutory
definition of a "purchaser." Thus, the vendee was subject not
only to preexisting unfiled tax liens, but also to liens for taxes
arising against the vendor after the contract was executed and
the vendee went into possession. 6 Now, however, that problem
has been largely obviated by the rule which provides that a per-
son who enters into a written executory contract to purchase
property is afforded the protection of a "purchaser" with title.167
Thus, in most situations the contract vendee who takes posses-
sion pursuant to an installment land contract is protected
against unfiled tax liens arising against the vendor before the
execution of the contract and against all liens arising thereafter.
However, some vendees still face a potential pitfall. Under
the Federal Tax Lien Act, protection of the contract vendee as a
"purchaser" is "conditioned upon his having taken whatever ac-
tion is necessary under local law to protect his interest against
subsequent purchasers without actual notice."' 68 In most states
the contract vendee's possession qualifies as constructive notice
against such subsequent purchasers. However, recording is nec-
essary in those states where possession does not so qualify. 69
Thus a vendee is not fully protected by simply examining title at
the time of execution of the contract and promptly going into
possession of the land. If a vendee fails to record, he may be
164. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982).
165. Id. § 6323(a).
166. See United States v. Creamer Indus., Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 957 (1965); Leipert v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
167. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(6)(B) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(f)(4) Example
1 (1976); W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENs 73 (3d ed. 1972).
168. PLUMB, supra note 167, at 73.
169. See supra note 149.
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vulnerable not only to preexisting unfiled tax liens, but also to
tax liens arising after the execution of the installment land
contract.
IX. TITLE PROBLEMS FOR VENDORS
As we pointed out earlier, there have been relatively few ti-
tle problems for the vendor in states that specifically regulate
forfeiture by statutory procedure. In those states, of which Iowa
and Minnesota are typical, the statutory procedure for termina-
tion has been institutionalized, and the statutes provide a mech-
anism for establishing record title in the vendor even if the ven-
dee has recorded the contract. However, in states without such
statutory mechanisms, and where the forfeiture clause is gov-
erned solely or largely by case law, the vendor faces potential
title problems. Indeed, in many such jurisdictions, the install-
ment land contract "will provide the .. .vendor with an effi-
cient and cheap method of regaining possession of the contract
land and a merchantable title only if the vendee fails completely
to assert his rights. ' 170 As one commentator noted:
Thus, if, after default, the vendee moves out of possession,
without protest and without having recorded the contract, the
vendor will be able to resell the land to a person who will prob-
ably qualify as a bona fide purchaser. In practice this probably
often happens and may explain, in part, why the installment
land contract is continually used. The thing to remember, how-
ever, is that any device is practical if the other party does
nothing to protect his rights.171
On the other hand, suppose the vendee attempts to protect
his rights by recording his contract and thereafter goes into de-
fault. Even if enforcing forfeiture would be valid under the cir-
cumstances, a court will require a judicial proceeding to make
that determination. A statement or affidavit that forfeiture has
occurred, recorded by the vendor, will probably not suffice.
Thus, the vendor is faced with the costly prospect of a
quiet title action or some other judicial proceeding to regain a
marketable title. The vendee, for settlement purposes, may
very well be able to demand much more than what he has in-
vested in the property as the price for a quit-claim deed.1 2
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Some vendors try to eliminate such problems by attempting
to prevent the recording of the contract. The most common
method used to accomplish this is to omit an acknowledgment of
the parties' execution of the contract. For any vendee repre-
sented by counsel, however, this method is easily circumvented
by recording an affidavit in which the vendee refers to the in-
stallment land contract and attaches the contract as an exhibit.
Or, as a variation, the vendee could execute and record an affi-
davit that incorporates the essential terms of the contract, in-
cluding the legal description, the parties, and the important
terms. Occasionally, a vendor will attempt to prevent recording
by keeping all copies of the contract. However, the vendee could
still probably use the second affidavit method described above.
After all, if in fact a land contract exists, it would surely not be
improper for a vendee to summarize the terms of that contract
in an affidavit. In jurisdictions that do not permit recordation of
affidavits and where state statutes prohibit recording of land
sale contracts unless acknowledged by vendors,"'3 an effective
variant might be to record an acknowledged assignment of the
vendee's interest to a straw party and a reassignment back to
the vendee.17 '
Occasionally, a vendor attempts to discourage recording by
the vendee by including a provision in the installment land con-
tract making recording of the contract a ground for default and
forfeiture. Such provisions may have a substantial deterrent ef-
fect because the risk of forfeiture should never be taken lightly.
Nevertheless, such provisions probably violate the public policy
of encouraging recording of interests in real estate. Indeed, Pro-
fessor Warren has indicated that it is doubtful that such clauses
would be effective "to attain anything more than the hostility of
the judge who has to interpret the contract. 17 5
173. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 696.01 (West 1969); Coggins v. Mimms, 373 So. 2d 964
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
174. Nelson, supra note 23, at 165-66. As we shall see, a vendee's interest is mort-
gageable. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. Thus, even if a vendee does not
record, a recorded mortgage from the vendee will similarly cloud the title. In any event,
it seems unlikely that the recording methods referred to in the text would constitute
slander on the vendor's title. See Nelson, supra note 23, at 166; see also Ridgewood
Utilities Corp. v. King, 426 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (land contract was re-
corded but not entitled to recordation because unacknowledged by vendor; vendor had
no cause of action for slander of title where there was no showing that the contract as
recorded was false and that vendor was damaged as a result of the recording).
175. Warren, supra note 102, at 629.
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Stated simply, in states where the above title complications
to the vendor can occur, the installment land contract can be a
"pro-vendee" financing device. When, for example, such con-
tracts are used in wholesale fashion as substitute financing de-
vices in low income, low down payment situations, mass record-
ing of such contracts by vendees could increase the vendees'
practical economic interests in the involved real estate. Another
possible result is pervasive title clouds on substantial amounts of
real estate.
The foregoing, of course, is not intended to deemphasize the
risks for the vendee under installment land contracts. Many of
these risks have been discussed previously. When the vendee has
paid a substantial amount on the contract and then defaults, the
vendor may choose to go to court to enforce a forfeiture clause.
Notwithstanding clouds on the vendor's title, what if the court
determines that forfeiture is reasonable? In that event a vendee
could lose his entire equity without a public sale. In addition,
some local recorders may occasionally block attempts by vendees
to record evidence of their contracts.' 6 In other words, the in-
stallment land contract device means, at best, uncertainty for
both sides.
It is perhaps understandable that, notwithstanding the
above risks, installment land contracts would be used in states
where mortgages must be foreclosed by a costly and time-con-
suming judicial action. This helps explain why installment land
contracts are popular in Iowa and Illinois, where such a judicial
proceeding is the only foreclosure remedy. On the other hand, in
many states, of which Missouri and Utah are typical, where the
power of sale mortgage or deed of trust is permissible and where
foreclosure is efficient and relatively inexpensive, reliance on the
installment land contract is difficult to understand or justify.177
We suggest several possible explanations for the widespread
use of installment land contracts. First, the use of installment
land contracts may spill over from states where they have been
used successfully to adjacent states where such use is especially
176. Such action on the part of the recorder may be unjustified or based on statu-
tory restrictions. See supra note 173.
177. While it is true that power of sale foreclosure has been under constitutional
attack on fourteenth amendment due process hearing and notice grounds, those attacks
have been meeting with diminishing success, primarily due to the reluctance of the
courts to find state action in foreclosures by nongovernmental leaders. See supra notes
103-17 and accompanying text.
[1985
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dangerous for vendors. Second, many vendors may use land con-
tracts in low down payment situations and take their chances
that the vendees will be unsophisticated. Finally, many vendors
may simply want to feel assured that they will receive their land
back if the vendee defaults. With a mortgage or a deed of trust,
of course, the mortgagee must ultimately foreclose against a de-
faulting mortgagor; a third party could purchase at the sale,
leaving the mortgagee with money and not land. Nonetheless, in
view of the uncertainty of the enforceability of the forfeiture
clause in many, if not most, jurisdictions, reliance on the forfei-
ture clause to regain one's land is probably misplaced.178
Many vendors erroneously believe that using an installment
sale contract rather than a purchase money mortgage is neces-
sary to qualify the sale for installment reporting under Section
453 of the Internal Revenue Code. In fact the form of the docu-
ment is unimportant.' The confusion probably arises from the
similarity of the Code's terminology under Section 453 to that
applied to real estate installment contracts.
However, one could argue that a more subtle reason exists
for preferring the installment land contract. To understand it,
some background information on Section 453's operation is nec-
essary. Its objective is to tax each payment received by the seller
in proportion to the fraction of the total gain which that pay-
ment represents; thus, the gain and the tax may be spread over
several taxable years. Specifically, the gain taxed on each pay-
ment is the amount of the payment multiplied by the gross
profit ratio. The gross profit ratio, in turn, is defined as the
gross profit (in essence, the gain) from the sale, divided by the
contract price.80 Mathematically, the formula is:
Gross Profit Ratio Gross Profit
Contract Price
Ordinarily when the seller is taking installment reporting under
Section 453 and the purchaser assumes or takes subject to an
178. See Nelson, supra note 23, at 167-68.
179. See 26 U.S.C. § 453(b)(1) (1982), defining an installment sale as "a disposition
of property. . . where at least one payment is to be received after the close of the taxa-
ble year in which the disposition occurs." Section 453 was extensively amended by the
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247, but its appli-
cation to both installment contracts and purchase money mortgages was unchanged.
180. See 26 U.S.C. § 453(c) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2) (1981); Emory &
Hjorth, An Analysis of the Changes Made by the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980-Part I, 54 J. TAX'N 66 (1981).
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existing mortgage on the property, the amount of the mortgage
is treated as reducing the contract price.""1 But when the mort-
gage amount exceeds the seller's basis in the property, that ex-
cess of mortgage over basis does not reduce the contract price.182
Instead, the excess is treated as being received by the seller in
the year of the sale.'8 3 For properties with large mortgages, but
in which the seller has a low basis, this may be a very undesir-
able result, as it will tend to "bunch" more gain into the year of
the sale.
The Tax Court in several cases has held that this result
does not follow if the sale is a "wraparound" one, under which
the seller continues to make the payments on the underlying
mortgage. Under this arrangement the buyer makes payments
only to the seller, and their amount is computed as if no prior
mortgage exists on the property. 8 4 The court took the view that
in a wraparound sale the underlying mortgage is neither being
assumed nor taken subject to in an economic sense. Thus, there
181. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(iii) (1981). This reduction of selling price
by the mortgage amount has the effect of increasing the gross profit ratio and therefore
of taxing a higher percentage of each actual payment received by the seller.
182. Id. If the full amount of the mortgage, including the part exceeding basis, were
applied to reduce the contract price, the denominator of the fraction (the contract price)
would be less than the numerator (the gross profit), and the gross profit ratio would be
greater than 100%. This would be unfair to the seller, since he has already been sepa-
rately taxed at the closing on the excess of mortgage over basis.
To illustrate, assume a property with a basis of $20,000, a mortgage of $60,000 and a
selling price of $100,000. If the full mortgage were applied to reduce the contract price,
the gross profit ratio would be
Gross Profit _ 80,000 - 200%
Contract Price 100,000 - 60,000
However, since the amount of mortgage in excess of basis




Contract Price 100,000 - 20,000
See Comment, Receipt of Payment in Installment Sales Transactions: Wraparound
Mortgages and Letters of Credit, 61 NEn. L. REv. 499, 506 (1982).
183. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(3)(i) (1981). Thus, in the example in the
preceding footnote, the seller would be treated as receiving the excess of mortgage over
basis, or $40,000, in the year of sale (plus, of course, any actual cash payments received
in that year). This aspect of the regulations was even more important prior to the In-
stallment Sales Revision Act of 1980, since under the preceding law installment reporting
was disallowed if the seller received more than 30% of the selling price in the year of
sale. The amount of mortgage in excess of basis might well be enough to eliminate in-
stallment reporting.
184. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 5.16 for a detailed discussion of wrap-
around mortgages.
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should be no reduction in the contract price to reflect the mort-
gage amount, and, most importantly, the seller should not be re-
garded as receiving the excess of mortgage over basis in the year
of sale.18 5
In its most recent regulations the IRS has explicitly rejected
this position of the Tax Court and has held that wraparound
transactions are no different than ordinary assumption or sub-
ject-to transfers for purposes of installment reporting.186 How-
ever, no clear warrant exists in the statute or the legislative his-
tory for the Service's position, and the regulations might be held
invalid.187 Parties planning a transaction with this eventuality in
mind might wish to structure it so as to qualify under the earlier
Tax Court cases. Nearly all those cases involved installment
land contracts rather than purchase money mortgages, and re-
tention of legal title by the seller may have been an important
factor in the outcome.1 88 The Tax Court has never clarified this
point. 89 Thus, a cautious planner designing a wraparound sale
for the most advantageous installment sale reporting might con-
clude that the installment land contract is preferable to a mort-
gage. In light of the Service's regulations, however, the argument
for use of the installment contract is attenuated.9 0
185. See United Pacific Corp. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 721 (1963); Estate of Lamberth v.
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 302 (1958); Stonecrest Corp. v. Comm'r, 24 T.C. 659 (1955); Comment,
supra note 182, at 511-521. The rationale of these cases seems to be based on the seller's
continuing personal obligation to make the payments on the underlying mortgage, so
that the buyer cannot be regarded as having either assumed or taken subject to it in an
economic sense. It is clear, of course, that whatever title passes to the buyer is encum-
bered by the mortgage, so that in real property terms it has been taken "subject to."
186. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(3)(ii) (1981) (applying to installment sales
after March 4, 1981). This regulation is consistent with the litigating position of the IRS
in the cases cited in the foregoing footnote. Under the regulations, it is immaterial
whether title has passed to the buyer.
187. See Comment, supra note 182, at 525-30.
188. In two private letter rulings prior to the issuance of the present regulations, the
IRS attempted to distinguish the Tax Court cases on the ground that they involved in-
stallment land contracts with no transfer of legal title. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,814,011 (Dec.
29, 1977); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,814,010 (Dec. 23, 1977). The proposition that the tax treat-
ment of the wraparound sale ought to depend on the location of legal title is, on its
merits, very dubious. See Comment, supra note 182, at 528 n.168. But see Gallagher,
Wraparound Mortgages and Deferred Payment Sales of Real Property, 56 TAXES 400
(1978).
189. The Tax Court explicitly refused to decide whether retention of title was rele-
vant to its wraparound mortgage position in Goodman v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 684, 712 n.16
(1980).
190. Attempting to qualify the transactions under the Tax Court's cases is frustrat-
ing in another way as well. If the seller in a wraparound transaction is not a financial
institution or a party of excellent credit and solvency, the buyer is well advised to make
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X. MORTGAGING THE VENDEE'S INTEREST-PROBLEMS FOR
MORTGAGEES
As a vendee pays off his obligations under an installment
land contract and particularly if the land goes up in value, the
vendee's interest can become a significant economic asset. Thus,
it is common practice for a vendee to seek to borrow money by
using his interest in the land as security for a loan. Functionally,
of course, a mortgage on a vendee's interest is the economic
equivalent of a second mortgage, because the vendor holds an
interest analogous to a first purchase money mortgage on the
land. Increasingly, the case law recognizes the proposition that
the vendee's interest is mortgageable. 9 '
To state this latter proposition, however, raises some serious
questions. The determination that the vendee has an interest
which can be mortgaged is of little use unless the mortgagee has
some way to protect his interest against the vendor's declaration
of forfeiture.
Thus, the cases overwhelmingly hold that when the vendor
has actual knowledge of the vendee's mortgagee, he cannot de-
clare a forfeiture of an installment land contract without giving
the vendee's mortgagee both notice of intent to forfeit and an
opportunity to protect himself.192 Furthermore, under the rea-
each regular payment into some form of trust, agency, or escrow arrangement, with the
trustee or agent having authority to split the funds, pay the amount due on the underly-
ing mortgage directly, and turn the remainder over to the seller. This approach is good
assurance against the possibility of the seller's default in making the payments on the
prior mortgage. Unfortunately, the Tax Court has held that if such an arrangement is
used, the entire mortgage in excess of basis must be realized as income in the year of the
sale, thus destroying the hoped-for tax advantage of the wraparound sale. See Goodman
v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 684 (1980).
191. See Davis v. Davis, 88 Ala. 523, 6 So. 908 (1889); Stannard v. Marboe, 159
Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Fincher v. Miles Homes, Inc., 549 S.W.2d 848 (Mo.
1977); O'Neill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mitchell, 209 Neb. 206, 307 N.W.2d 115 (1981);
Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981); Bill Nay & Sons Excavating
v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984). But see Arkansas Supply, Inc. v.
Young, 265 Ark. 281, 580 S.W.2d 174 (1979) (where a vendee had paid only $150 of a
$15,000 purchase price under an installment land contract, he did not possess a mort-
gageable interest).
Such a mortgage typically is perfected against third party claimants of the vendee
by recording it in the real estate records. Perfection under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is probably unnecessary. See In re Chimento, 43 Bankr. 401 (Bankr. Ohio
1984).
192. See, e.g., Credit Finance, Inc. v. Bateman, 135 Ariz. 268, 660 P.2d 869 (1983);
Lockhart Co. v. B.F.K. Ltd., 691 P.2d 1248 (Ida. App. 1984); Fincher v. Miles Homes,
Inc., 549 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1977); Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127
(1924); Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981) (dictum); Kendrick v.
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soning of some of the cases, even when the vendor lacks actual
knowledge of the vendee's mortgagee, recording by the vendee's
mortgagee constitutes constructive notice to the vendor that the
mortgagee exists. This constructive notice imposes a duty on the
vendor to examine the title to the land prior to declaring a for-
feiture in order to ensure that notice can be given to any subse-
quent mortgagee of the vendee's interest.193 On the other hand,
some courts have held that, absent actual knowledge of the
mortgagee's existence, the vendor is under no obligation to no-
tify the mortgagee of his intent to declare a forfeiture. 94 This
latter approach relies on the notion that recording an instru-
ment constitutes notice only to those acquiring interest in the
land subsequent to a recording and not to those whose interest
predated that recording. The practical effect of such reasoning is
that a mortgagee, in order to protect himself, must give actual
notice to the vendor at the time the mortgagee takes his security
interest.195
Assuming that notice of an intent to invoke forfeiture
reaches the vendee's mortgagee, how may the mortgagee protect
himself? It has been suggested that notice would permit the
mortgagee to fulfill the obligations of the vendee under the con-
tract.19 6 If this means that the mortgagee may take over the ven-
dee's interest without foreclosure of the mortgage, it would seem
to be clearly erroneous, since it would confer on a mortgagee of
the vendee greater rights than those possessed by a second mort-
gagee in the normal mortgage situation. In the normal situation,
the second mortgagee has two options when the senior mortgage
goes into default. First, he may pay off or redeem the senior
mortgage and stand in the senior's shoes as an assignee of that
mortgage. At that point, the second mortgagee would own two
mortgages on the land and would have to foreclose one or both
Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969). Contra Estate of Brewer v. Iota Delta
Chapter, - Ore. _, 692 P.2d 597 (1984). See also Roberts v. Morin, 198 Mont. 233,
645 P.2d 423 (1982) (vendee who resells land on second installment land contract enti-
tled to notice from the original vendor prior to declaration of forfeiture of the first
contract).
193. See, e.g., Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); see also 45
WASH. L. REv. 645, 646 (1970).
194. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969); Shin-
dledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981).
195. For a cogent criticism of this approach, see Note, Mortgages-Mortgage of a
Vendee's Interest in an Installment Land Contract-Mortgagee's Rights Upon Default,
43 Mo. L. Rav. 371, 373-374 (1978).
196. See 45 WASH. L. REV. 645, 646 (1970).
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of them in order to acquire either money or title to the land.
Alternatively, the second mortgagee could foreclose his mort-
gage, and the purchaser at that sale would buy the land subject
to the first mortgage. 197 The foreclosing second mortgagee would
get title only if he were the successful purchaser at the sale. Oth-
erwise the second mortgagee would have his lien paid off. But in
no event can the second mortgagee acquire title to the land
without himself foreclosing.
In applying the mortgage analogy to the installment land
contract situation, it would seem that the vendee's mortgagee
should have no greater rights than a "normal" second mortga-
gee. In other words, the vendee's mortgagee should have two op-
tions. First, he could pay off the defaulted land contract and
have all the rights of an assignee of the vendor under that con-
tract. Assuming forfeiture is enforceable in his jurisdiction, the
mortgagee-assignee presumably could then himself invoke the
forfeiture rights under the contract.198 But in no event should he
be able to eradicate the vendee's interest without invoking the
functional equivalent of foreclosure. Second, the mortgagee
could choose to foreclose his mortgage on the vendee's interest.
In that case the purchaser at the sale would buy the land subject
to the vendor's rights.199 The mortgagee would either purchase
the land himself or be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. This
second option is, of course, highly risky, because if the vendor is
able to invoke forfeiture promptly, the purchaser at the vendee's
mortgagee's foreclosure sale may simply be buying nothing.
Very often, mortgagees of a vendee's interest make the mis-
take of taking an assignment of the vendee's interest and a quit-
claim deed from the vendee as security for the loan to the ven-
dee. This transaction, of course, will be treated substantively as
a mortgage.200 The problem is that the use of such documents
means that the mortgagee's second option, foreclosure of his
197. See NELSON, supra note 16, at 497-499.
198. See Note, supra note 195, at 376-377. But see Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173
N.W.2d 896 (N.D. 1969).
199. See Note, supra note 195, at 376-377. Alternatively, the mortgagee may obtain
a deed in lieu of foreclosure from the vendee; see Erickson v. First Nat'1 Bank,
Mont. - , 697 P.2d 1332 (1985).
200. See Erickson v. First Nat'l Bank, - Mont. - , 697 P.2d 1332
(1985); O'Neill Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mitchell, 209 Neb. 206, 307 N.W.2d 115 (1981);
Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969); Cunningham & Tischler, Dis-
guised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1 (1972).
[1985
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mortgage, must be accomplished by a costly and time-consuming
judicial action. This is so because the assignment and quitclaim
deed will contain no power of sale, so that even if the particular
jurisdiction permits nonjudicial foreclosure, the mortgagee could
not utilize that remedy. Thus, if a mortgage on a vendee's inter-
est is desired and if the applicable jurisdiction permits nonjudi-
cial foreclosure, the mortgagee of the vendee should utilize a
mortgage or deed of trust with an express power of sale instead
of the assignment and quitclaim documents.
XI. JUDGMENTS AGAINST PARTIES TO INSTALLMENT LAND
CONTRACTS
In almost all states a judgment creates a lien on the real,
but usually not the personal, property of the judgment debtor.2 1'
While the mechanics of obtaining a lien and the lien's effective
date vary somewhat, typically a lien applies to all real estate of
the judgment debtor in the county in which the judgment is
docketed by a court clerk in an appropriate docket book.20 2 The
time of docketing usually determines lien priority. Conse-
quently, when the judgment debtor is either a vendee or vendor
under an installment land contract, the characterization of the
debtor's interest as real or personal property can be crucial in
determining the rights of the judgment creditor.
A. Judgments Against Vendee
Most states hold that the vendee's interest is real estate for
purposes of judgment lien legislation and that a judgment credi-
tor of a vendee thus obtains a valid lien on the vendee's contract
interest.20 3 The practical implications of this rule can be illus-
trated by a hypothetical. Suppose that a vendee has paid off
$40,000 of an installment land contract price of $100,000. The
land then has a fair market value of $100,000 free and clear of
liens. The vendee's creditor then dockets a $15,000 judgment
201. See D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 46, 52-53 (2d ed. 1980).
202. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.09 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
511.350 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (Supp. 1983); D. EPSTEIN, supra
note 201, at 46.
203. See, e.g., Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677
(1973); Fridley v. Munson, 46 S.D. 532, 194 N.W. 840 (1923); Bill Nay & Sons Excavating
v. Neeley Const. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984); Utah Coop. Ass'n v. White Distrib. and
Supply Co., 120 Utah 603, 237 P.2d 262 (1951); Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 88
Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
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against the vendee in a county where the contract land is lo-
cated. The vendee then borrows $30,000 from the mortgagee and
gives it a mortgage on the contract land. The mortgagee
promptly records the mortgage. The vendee then defaults on the
mortgage and the mortgagee forecloses. Because the judgment
against the vendee is a valid lien on the vendee's interest and
because it was docketed prior to execution and recordation of
the mortgage, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale will buy the
vendee's interest subject to the judgment lien.
Courts justify the foregoing result either as an application of
the equitable conversion concept or as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation. Under the equitable conversion theory, from the
time an earnest money or installment land contract is executed,
the vendee's interest is considered in equity to be real estate
while the vendor's retention of legal title and the right to receive
the balance of the purchase price is deemed to be personalty.2 04
Other courts eschew the equitable conversion approach and sim-
ply hold that the legislature intended that the vendee's interest
be treated as real estate for purposes of judgment lien legisla-
tion.20 5 These courts prefer the statutory construction approach
because they are concerned over the uncertainty of the equitable
conversion concept and the implications that its application
would create for other areas, such as devolution at death, wills
and trusts. 06
A judgment creditor of a vendee must sometimes cope with
a related and potentially more troublesome issue. Some courts
have held that a judgment lien does not attach to equitable in-
terests in real estate. Accordingly, a contract vendee's interest,
being equitable, is not subject to the lien.20 7 Increasingly, how-
204. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677 (1973); Bartz
v. Paff, 95 Wis. 95, 69 N.W. 297 (1897); cf. Westfair Corp. v. Kuelz, 90 Wis. 2d 631, 280
N.W.2d 364 (1979); R. LEAVELL, J. Lovw & G. NELsoN, EQuITABLE REMEDIES AND RESTiTU-
TON 356-57 (3d. ed. 1980); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, PROPERTY
§ 10.13 nn.14-24 (1984); Hume, Real Estate Contracts and the Doctrine of Equitable
Conversion in Washington: Dispelling the Ashford Cloud, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
233, 240 (1984).
205. Joseph v. Donovan, 114 Conn. 79, 157 A. 638 (1931); Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So.
2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567
P.2d 631 (1977); Note, Article 9 Governs Assignment of Vendor's Rights Under an In-
stallment Land Contract as Security for a Debt, 47 Mo. L. REv. 328, 331 (1982).
206. See, e.g., Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631
(1977).
207. See, e.g., Cheves v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 Fla. 34, 83 So. 870 (1920); Warren v.
Rodgers, 82 N.M. 78, 475 P.2d 775 (1970); FCX, Inc. v. Long Meadow Farms, Inc., 269
[1985
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ever, courts are interpreting judgment lien legislation broadly to
make equitable, as well as legal, interests subject to the lien.2"'
Consequently, it is becoming more likely that a judgment lien
will attach to an installment vendee's interest notwithstanding
its equitable nature.0 9
B. Judgments Against Vendor
Despite the equitable conversion theory, the majority of ju-
risdictions treat the vendor's installment land contract interest
as real estate for purposes of judgment lien statutes.21 0 Thus, as
one court stated, the judgment lien "extends to all of the ven-
dor's interest remaining in the land and binds the land to the
extent of the unpaid purchase price. '211 One basis for this theory
is that the vendor has a real estate interest because he or she
retains legal title to the land until the contract is fully paid and
the deed is delivered to the vendee.2 12 Perhaps an equally plausi-
ble basis for the majority rule is simply that the vendor has an
interest in real estate to the extent of the unpaid purchase
price.213
A minority of jurisdictions characterize the vendor's interest
as personalty for purposes of judgment lien legislation.1 4 This
result is based not only on the fact that, for purposes of the eq-
uitable conversion doctrine, 21 5 the vendor has personalty, but
also on the notion that, since courts overwhelmingly characterize
S.C. 202, 237 S.E.2d 50 (1977); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 717 (1948).
208. See Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677 (1973)
(overruling Warren v. Rogers, 82 N.M. 78, 475 P.2d 775 (1970)); Fridley v. Munson, 46
S.D. 532, 194 N.W. 840 (1923); Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wash. 2d 96, 190
P.2d 718 (1948).
209. See, e.g., Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677
(1973).
210. See, e.g., Chain O'Mines, Inc. v. Williamson, 101 Colo. 231, 72 P.2d 265 (1937);
First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967); Bauermeister v. McDonald,
124 Neb. 142, 247 N.W. 424 (1932); Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105, 380 P.2d 619 (1963);
Heath v. Dodson, 7 Wash. 2d 667, 110 P.2d 845 (1941); Note, supra note 206, at 330-31.
211. First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967).
212. Note, supra note 205, at 331.
213. Lacy, supra note 151, at 505.
214. See, e.g., Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979); Mueller
v. Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881 (1956); Church, Equitable Conver-
sion in Wisconsin, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 404, 418-19.
215. See Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979); Mueller v.
Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W. 2d 881 (1956).
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the vendee's interest as real estate, it is illogical that the vendor
should have a real estate interest as well.21
Again, an example is helpful in understanding the implica-
tions of the majority and minority approaches. Suppose that an
installment contract vendor is still entitled to collect $50,000
over the next four years. X then dockets a $20,000 judgment
against the vendor in the county where the contract land is lo-
cated. Y then dockets a $40,000 judgment against the vendor in
the same county. Y holds an execution sale on the judgment and
purchases at the sale for $40,000. In a majority rule state, Y
clearly paid too much. Under the majority rule the vendor's in-
terest is real estate and thus both judgments are liens on that
interest. Their relative priority is determined by the date each
judgment was docketed. Accordingly, since Y's judgment was
docketed later than X's judgment, Y purchased the vendor's in-
terest subject to X's unpaid $20,000 lien. On the other hand, Y
is much better off if the foregoing fact situation occurs in a mi-
nority jurisdiction. In such states the vendor's interest is person-
alty. As such, a judgment creditor can obtain no interest in it
until it is levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to the issuance of a
writ of execution. 17 The date of judgment docketing establishes
no priority; rather, the first execution sale passes title to the per-
sonalty free and clear of any other judgment no matter when it
was docketed. Thus, in our example, even though Y's judgment
was obtained after X's, Y purchased at the execution sale a title
free and clear of any lien in favor of X.
XII. MORTGAGING THE VENDOR'S INTEREST-PROBLEMS FOR
MORTGAGEES
The vendor's interest in an installment land contract is
clearly mortgageable2 18 Traditionally, those who lend money on
the security of a vendor's interest commonly treat the transac-
tion as a simple mortgage on a fee interest in real estate. In
other words, the lender assumes that because the vendor holds
legal title, he or she is the "real owner" of the land described in
the contract until the contract is fully paid off. Consequently,
216. Note, supra note 205, at 331.
217. See D. EPSTmIN, supra note 201, at 52-53.
218. See, e.g., Erickson v. First Nat'l Bank, - Mont. _, 697 P.2d 1332 (1985);
Cain & Bultman, Inc. v. Miss Sam, Inc., 409 So. 2d 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In re
Freeborn, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424 (1980).
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the lender takes a regular mortgage and an assignment of the
vendor's contract interest. The lender usually records the mort-
gage and sometimes the assignment in the real estate records. As
a variant, instead of taking a mortgage, the lender may take a
deed to the contract land together with an assignment and then
record one or both in the real estate records.
2 19
The foregoing practice is usually assumed to protect the
lender's priority against both unsecured and subsequent lien
creditors of the vendor. However, a Washington Supreme Court
decision, In re Freeborn,220 calls this practice and its underlying
assumptions into serious question. The Washington Supreme
Court held that if the vendor's lender desires to have a security
interest in the vendor's right to receive the contract payments
that will have priority over claims against those payments by
subsequent lien creditors, including a trustee in bankruptcy, the
vendor's lender must perfect that claim as a chattel security in-
terest under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
court's reasoning was premised on the notion that the vendor
has both legal title to the land (realty) and the right to receive
the contract payments (personalty). The court further reasoned
that while taking and recording a mortgage or similar documents
in the land records protects the lender against subsequent
claims to the vendor's legal land title, it does not protect the
lender against subsequent claims on the vendor's right to receive
the contract payments. Since only real estate recording had oc-
curred, the security interests in Freeborn were deemed
unperfected.
The Freeborn court found support for its conclusion that
the vendor's right to receive the contract payments was person-
alty in an earlier Washington decision 221 that characterized the
vendor's installment land contract interest as personalty for
community property purposes. In addition, it relied on Cascade
Security Bank v. Butler,222 which, while rejecting the applica-
tion of the equitable conversion concept,22 3 held that an install-
ment vendee's interest was real estate for purposes of Washing-
ton's judgment lien statute. The Freeborn court also emphasized
219. See, e.g., In re Freeborn, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424 (1980).
220. Id.; see Note, supra note 205.
221. Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wash. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348 (1972).
222. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
223. Id.; see Hume, supra note 204, at 233.
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other Washington case law holding the vendor's contract interest
to be personalty.224
More significant, however, is the Freeborn court's article 9
analysis, which is based on a straight mortgage transaction anal-
ogy. The court cited an official comment to section 9-101(3)
which states that although article 9 does not apply to the crea-
tion of a real estate mortgage itself, "when the mortgagee
pledges the note to secure his own obligation to X, this Article
applies to the security interest thus created, which is a security
interest in an instrument even though the instrument is secured
by a real estate mortgage." 22 5 The court reasoned that the situa-
tion described in the comment-"where the mortgagee pledges
the note to secure his own obligation to a third party-[was]
analogous to the [case before it]. Here, the vendor and holder of
legal title assigned the right to receive real estate contract pay-
ments in order to secure his obligation to a third party. '226 Fi-
nally, the court relied on a Florida federal trial court decision 227
for the proposition that article 9 "applied to security interests in
'realty paper'" and for its holding that article 9 governed where
installment land contracts were delivered to the vendor's lender
pursuant to security pledge agreement.
The Freeborn approach has been followed by several other
courts. '28 By analogizing installment contracts to notes secured
by mortgages, the Freeborn court followed the current trend.
Under this analysis the case is partly correct and partly wrong.
It is now becoming clear that article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code applies to the perfection of security interests in mort-
gage notes. 29 On this point Freeborn was right. The method of
224. Pierce County v. King, 47 Wash. 2d 328, 287 P.2d 316 (1955) (vendor's interest
is personalty for inheritance tax purposes); In re Eilermann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35
P.2d 763 (1934) (vendor's interest is personalty for purposes of succession and
administration).
225. U.C.C. § 9-102 official comment 4 (1978).
226. 94 Wash. 2d at 343, 617 P.2d at 428.
227. In re Equitable Dev. Corp., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349 (S.D. Fla.
1976).
228. In re Southworth, 22 Bankr. 376 (D. Kan. 1982) (both realty and Code filing
necessary); In re Shuster, 47 Bankr. 920 (D. Minn. 1985) (Code filing necessary, realty
filing left open). In re S.O.A.W. Enterprises, Inc., 32 Bankr. 279 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (Code
filing sufficient); In re Equitable Dev. Corp. 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349 (S.D.
Fla. 1976) (Code filing sufficient).
229. See In re Staff Mortgage & Inv. Co., 625 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Ken-
nedy Mortgage Co., 17 Bankr. 957, 964-65 (D.N.J. 1982). See generally NELSON & WHrr-
mAN, supra note 3, § 5.28 n.40.
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perfection for notes, which is transfer of possession to the se-
cured party, probably does not apply to installment contracts,
since they are evidently not "instruments" as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code employs the term.23 0 Hence, an installment con-
tract is correctly understood to be a "general intangible" in the
Code's parlance; and a security interest in it must be perfected
by the filing of a financing statement.2 31 But with respect to the
real property interest, Freeborn's attempt to assimilate install-
ment contracts to mortgages breaks down. It is well recognized
that an assignment of a mortgage note will carry the mortgage
with it automatically. 2  The cases are increasingly taking the
view that, even when the transfer is for security purposes, the
mortgage will attach to the note when it is delivered into the
hands of the pledgee, and will be regarded as perfected irrespec-
tive of whether any assignment was recorded in the real estate
records. 233 Freeborn displays no awareness of these cases, and
instead insists on treating the realty interest as a separate spe-
cies which must be perfected-by recording-in its own right.
Surely this is a waste of effort. Conceptually the real estate
interest may be separated from the payment stream, but the
separation is meaningless in practical terms. If one holds the re-
alty interest but has no right to the payments, his interest has
no value. He obviously cannot sue for damages, specific perform-
ance, or any other money remedy. He cannot declare a forfeiture
because no debt is owed to him. His "rights" are as empty and
useless as those of a mortgagee when someone else holds the
note; they are nugatory.13 4
Why, then, put the pledgee of the vendor's interest at risk
of losing his security in the land if he does not record in the real
estate records? Certainly one recording-in the financing state-
ment files-is sufficient if practitioners and the public know that
230. See U.C.C. § 9-105(i) (1978), defining an "instrument" as a paper "of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary en-
dorsement or assignment." Customs vary from one area of the nation to another, but it
would be difficult to say that there is a broad custom of transferring or pledging install-
ment contracts by delivery of the original contract document. Perfection of a security
interest in an "instrument" can be accomplished only by delivery. U.C.C. § 9-304(1)
(1978).
231. U.C.C, § 9-106 (1978). A security interest in a "general intangible" can be per-
fected only by filing a financing statement, U.C.C. § 9-304 official comment 1 (1978). See
cases cited supra note 228.
232. See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 3, § 5.27 nn.5-13 and accompanying text.
233. See cases cited supra note 229; NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 3, § 5.28 n.40.
234. See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 3, § 5.27 nn.5-13.
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they must search there. No policy is served by forcing everyone
to use both a belt and suspenders. The court, we suggest, should
have simply carried the mortgage law analogy to its logical con-
clusion by finding the Code filing sufficient for complete perfec-
tion. The only objection to this view is that it is contrary to
long-established habits in many areas; but once the law is clari-
fied, those habits can be changed.
One caution must be added. Installment contracts are not
always recorded, and a vendor quite conceivably will enter into
one and later purport to mortgage the land as security for a
loan, say from a bank, without disclosing the contract's exis-
tence. In a formalistic sense, such a mortgage is of the vendor's
interest in the contract, and hence should be perfected under
article 9 as suggested above. But in practice this requirement
makes no sense if the bank has no notice of the contract's exis-
tence. Indeed, the bank will have no reason to suppose that any-
thing other than the land itself is serving as its security, and will
have no idea that article 9 is involved in any way.
In this situation applying article 9 would be manifestly un-
fair. The bank should be held to article 9's perfection rules only
if it is on actual or constructive notice from the recorded con-
tract or the vendee's possession that the contract exists. Impos-
ing constructive notice on the bank entails no extra burden in
this setting. The bank will normally search the realty records
and obtain title insurance when its borrower presents it with
what purports to be a mortgage on fee simple ownership.
Whatever its merits, Freeborn and its progeny exist and
cannot be ignored. Until the law is further clarified, those who
take security interests in the installment vendor's rights are well
advised to record some appropriate instrument-a deed, an as-
signment of contract rights, or both-in the real estate records
and file a financing statement. The added expense and inconve-
nience of following Freeborn seem a small price to pay for the
enhanced protection the vendor's creditor will get as against
third party claimants.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Traditionally the forfeiture remedy available under install-
ment land contracts has involved substantial risks for vendees
and considerable benefits for vendors. In modern practice, how-
ever, the risk allocation has changed. When forfeiture occurs, it
may still have harsh, even devastating, economic effects on
[1985
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vendees. But at the same time the uncertainty which infects the
vendor's rights has become nearly intolerable. A declaration of
forfeiture is often nothing more than an invitation to litigate. If
the vendee is willing to roll over like a dead dog, forfeiture may
be an attractive remedy. But where the vendee proposes to
stand on his rights, the contract suddenly begins to lose its
luster for the vendor.
Uncertainty pervades other aspects of the contract as well.
Few vendors or vendees can be certain about the best way of
documenting an outright transfer of their interests, and credi-
tors who wish to take security in those interests are in an even
more murky situation. The vendor who has carried off a success-
ful forfeiture may still face uncertainty as to the proper method
of clearing his title of the now-defunct, but recorded, contract.
These problems were solved by mortgage law decades or even
centuries ago; but for installment contract parties, they are live
and thorny issues.
In most states in which installment contracts are heavily
employed, the driving force behind their use is a cumbersome
and costly judicial foreclosure process for mortgages. Where
nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of
trust is available, the incentive to use the installment contract
simply disappears. The trend of the law, which we applaud and
encourage, is the enactment of well-drafted power of sale legisla-
tion which permits reasonably speedy and inexpensive realiza-
tion on real estate security. If this movement continues, the in-
stalment contract may eventually be relegated to the position it
deserves as a relic of legal history.
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